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ABSTRACT
One widely shared understanding of the Due Process Clause in the
late eighteenth century encompassed judicial recognition of
unenumerated substantive rights as limits on congressional power.
This concept of "substantive" due process originated in Sir Edward
Coke's notion of a "higher law" constitutionalism, which understood
natural and customary rights as limits on crown prerogatives and
parliamentary lawmaking. The American colonies adopted higher-
law constitutionalism in their revolutionary struggle and carried it
with them through independence and constitutional ratification.
Natural and customary rights limited the exercise of legislative
power in the late eighteenth century through the normative definition
of "law" inherited from the classical natural law tradition, which
maintained that an unjust law was not really a "law." American
judges and attorneys did not consider legislative acts that violated
natural or customary rights to be real "laws," regardless of their
compliance with a positivist rule of recognition. Accordingly,
deprivations of life, liberty, or property effected on the authority of
such acts did not comply with the "law" of the land or the due
process of "law" because regardless of the process such acts
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afforded, the deprivations they imposed were not accomplished by a
true "law." The classical understanding of "law" and the
substantive understanding of due process that it underwrote are
evident in legal dictionaries and in judicial decisions and arguments
of counsel during the years immediately before and after ratification
of the Bill of Rights in 1791.
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It is difficult to imagine a more maligned constitutional doctrine than
"substantive due process." Referring to the proposition that the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments constitutionalized
unenumerated substantive rights, substantive due process formally debuted in
Chief Justice Taney's infamous Dred Scott opinion.' After that inauspicious
beginning, things never really got any better. For more than a century, sharp
and sustained criticism of substantive due process has been a fact of
constitutional life in the United States.
2
This criticism has had particular resonance since the 1980s, when the
Reagan Administration endorsed "originalism" as the only legitimate approach
to constitutional interpretation. 3  The most widely defended version of this
interpretive theory holds that the contemporary meaning of a constitutional
provision is the meaning that was understood by the people who lived at the
time that the provision was proposed by Congress and ratified by the states.
4
Sometimes called public-meaning originalism, this version is concerned with
uncovering a purportedly objective public meaning, and is distinct from
"intentional meaning" originalism, which focuses on the subjective
understanding of a constitutional text by those who framed or ratified it.5 A
1 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857) ("And an act of Congress which
deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought
his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the
laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.").
2 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("1 think that the
word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a
dominant opinion .... ); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) ("[Uinder no construction
of [due process of law] that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the restraint imposed by
the State of Louisiana upon the exercise of their trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held to be a
deprivation of property within the meaning of that provision."); ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA
114 (1990) (scornfully referring to Roe v. Wade's substantive due process protection of abortion rights as a
"judicial fiat"); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 942
(1973) (suggesting that Roe is a more dangerous precedent than Lochner).
3 See, e.g., Edwin Meese 111, Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in MAJOR
POLICY STATEMENTS OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL: EDWIN MEESE III, 1985-1988, at 7 (1989).
4 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
92 (2004); BORK, supra note 2, at 144; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 17 (1997); KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 35 (1999).
5 E.g., BARNETT, supra note 4, at 92; BORK, supra note 2, at 144; Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist
and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081,
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public-meaning originalist would interpret the 1787 constitutional text and the
1791 Bill of Rights in accordance with the common usage and public
understanding of the words of those texts in the 1780s and 1790s; the
Reconstruction Amendments of 1865, 1868, and 1870 in accordance with such
usage and understanding in the 1860s and 1870s; and so forth. Proponents of
originalism argue that adherence to original meaning in constitutional
interpretation prevents federal judges (and especially Supreme Court Justices)
from giving their personal value preferences the force of constitutional law.
6
The doctrine of substantive due process has been a particular source of
interpretive controversy. By their terms, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
7
and Fourteenth Amendments appear to protect only rights to legal process.
1081 (2005); Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On Originalism, Due
Process, Procedural Innovation... and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2007).
For critiques of intended-meaning originalism, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985). For defenses of intended-meaning originalism, see Richard S. Kay,
Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw.
U. L. REV. 226 (1988); Robert G. Natelson, The Founders' Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239 (2007).
Throughout this Article, I use "originalism" to mean public-meaning originalism unless otherwise
indicated.
6 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 371 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY]; BORK, supra note 2, at
146; Kay, supra note 5, at 287; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 863-
64 (1989); see also Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the Supreme Court Nomination of Robert H.
Bork, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1177, 1178 (Oct. 14, 1987), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives
speeches/l987/101487b.htm ("The principal errors in recent years have had nothing to do with the intent of the
framers .... They've had to do with those who have looked upon the courts as their own special province to
impose by judicial fiat what they could not accomplish at the polls."); Franklin D. Roosevelt, A "Fireside
Chat" Discussing the Plan for Reorganization of the Judiciary, I PUB. PAPERS 122, 126 (Mar. 9, 1937),
available at http://www.hpol.org/fdr/chat/ (criticizing the economic due process holdings of the pre-New Deal
Court as the Justices' insertion of their own "personal economic predilections" into the Constitution (quoting
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 633 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting))).
Recognizing that judicial policy making is unavoidable when one interprets open-ended texts like the
Due Process Clauses, some recent originalist scholarship has proposed to limit such policy making through
bounded strategies of constitutional "construction." See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 4, ch. 5 (arguing that
judges should construe open-ended constitutional texts in the manner that best protects individual rights);
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
ch. 1 (1999) (arguing that because constitutional construction is largely a political activity, judges should defer
to constructions adopted by the political branches).
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person.., be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law .... "); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 ("[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "). But see Walter Dellinger, Remarks on Jeffrey Rosen's
Paper, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1293 (1998) (arguing that the text of the Due Process Clauses has an
"irreducibly 'substantive' content" rooted in the fact that an absence of substantive restrictions on government
renders procedural restrictions "worthless").
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Moreover, with respect to the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, an
overwhelming scholarly consensus holds that it protects only procedural
rights . Originalism has emerged as yet another weapon against the doctrine of
substantive due process-that is, against judicial recognition and enforcement
of individual rights that are not enumerated in the constitutional text,9 and in
support of a more constrained judiciary that subordinates such rights to the
actions of the elected branches of the federal and state governments.1
0
But originalism is more than a supplemental argument against
unenumerated rights and judicial activism. In addition to possessing a
powerful, intuitive appeal," originalism rests on a plausible philosophical
foundation, highlighted by the fact that writing is an intentional act. As
8 See, e.g., BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 221-44; 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1102-08 (1953); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 15 (1980); Walton Hamilton, The
Path of Due Process of Law, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 168 (Conyers Read ed., 1968); LEONARD
W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 248 (1999); ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 461 (1935); HERMINE HERTA MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 125 (1977); HUGH EVANDER WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 705-06 (1936); Christopher Wolfe, The Original Meaning of the Due Process Clause, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 213 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991); Raoul
Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Berger, "Law of the
Land"]; Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366,
368 (1910) [hereinafter Corwin, Due Process]; Charles Grove Haines, Judicial Review of Legislation in the
United States and the Doctrines of Vested Rights and of Implied Limitations of Legislatures (pts. 1-3), 2 TEX.
L. REV. 257 (1924), 2 TEX. L. REV. 387 (1924), 3 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1924); Charles M. Hough, Due Process of
Law-To-Day, 32 HARV. L. REV. 218 (1919); Andrew T. Hyman, The Little Word "Due," 38 AKRON L. REV.
1, 2 (2005); Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process of Law, 19
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265 (1975) [hereinafter Jurow, Untimely Thoughts]; Robert P. Reeder, The Due Process
Clauses and "The Substance of Individual Rights," 58 U. PA. L. REV. 191 (1910); Charles Warren, The New
"Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926); Ralph U. Whitten, The
Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full
Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (pt. 2), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 735 (1981).
9 See JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 133-34 (2005); Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 25 (1998).
10 See O'NEILL, supra note 9, at 231; Friedman & Smith, supra note 9, at 87.
11 See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J.
449, 514 (1989) (describing the nature of originalist imagery, which portrays judges as "keepers of the
covenant" and provides a powerful link with the past); Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an "Ism," 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 301, 308 (1996) (suggesting that the widespread appeal to originalism in
constitutional interpretation, even by non-originalists, constitutes strong evidence that the theory is
intellectually legitimate); Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 779
(arguing that, beyond its potential for justifying conservative policy outcomes, originalism has a deep and
widespread appeal because of its apparent neutrality, especially in comparison with other theories of
constitutional interpretation).
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numerous commentators have pointed out, human beings are uninterested in
interpreting signs that lack a sentient author-that is, in attributing meaning to
randomly occurring marks that are unrelated to any human communicative
intention. 12  According to this argument, signs or marks that lack a sentient
author cannot be "writing" because the meaning of any writing is identical to
the message that its author meant to communicate.'
3
14If writing generally is an intentional act, then written law is especially so.
Laws have "purposes"; once enacted, they are expected to have certain effects,
to "do" something that the lawmakers intended to be done. Written law is
"written" precisely to fix a particular (albeit collective) human intention in
words. 15  Written law is thus the paradigmatic example of writing as an
intentional act.'
6
Originalism rhetorically grounds this relationship between intention and
writing. 17 An originalist would argue that the framers had certain purposes that
they expected the Constitution to fulfill.' 8  As rational, intelligent, and well-
educated individuals, the framers can be presumed to have written the
Constitution in those words that best communicated these purposes to the
people it would bind. 19 What else could the words of the Constitution mean,
12 The classic exposition of this view is Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, 8
CRITICAL INQUIRY 723 (1982), reprinted in AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM
18 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985), which argues that the meaning of a text is simply and necessarily the meaning
intended by its author, obviating the need for "theories" of interpretation. See generally E.D. HIRSCH,
VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION (1967); JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION (2004). Numerous
legal academics have adapted this intentionalist account to legal and (especially) constitutional interpretation.
See, e.g., Paul Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 279, 284 (1992); Steven D.
Smith, Correspondence: Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104 (1989).
13 See Knapp & Michaels, supra note 12, at 19 (arguing that this identity "robs intention of any
theoretical interest").
14 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 4, at 59-60; Campos, supra note 12, at 302; Smith, supra note 12, at
112, 115.
15 See Kay, supra note 5, at 239; Smith, supra note 12, at I11.
16 See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalismfor Nonoriginalists, 45 LoY. L. REV. 611,633 (1999).
17 See, e.g., id. at 636 (arguing that the "original meaning of a text" binds us because we "profess our
commitment to a written constitution, and original meaning interpretation follows inexorably from that
commitment").
18 WHITTINGTON, supra note 4, at 60. Unlike intended-meaning originalism, public-meaning originalism
does not give controlling authority to these subjective understandings and expectations. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
19 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 4, at 60; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824)
("As men, whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly
express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people
who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what
they have said.").
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then, if not what those words were publicly understood to mean at the time that
the Constitution was drafted and ratified?
20
As recent Supreme Court nominations have made unmistakably clear,
21
originalism now defines the terms of public debates about constitutional
22meaning. Given the political, intuitive, philosophical, and rhetorical appeal
of originalism, proponents of substantive due process can no longer ignore the
question whether the doctrine is defensible on originalist grounds.
An originalist defense of substantive due process under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause would be particularly important for at least
three reasons. First, such a defense would provide a textual footing in the Fifth
Amendment for important substantive rights that bind the federal government
23
only through that Amendment's Due Process Clause, such as the right to
"fundamental fairness" in criminal and civil proceedings, 24 the right to equal
25protection of the laws, and the right to an equally weighted vote in elections
for federal office.26 Second, most authorities hold that the original meanings
20 Cf Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 9 ("[I]t is difficult to understand why one would adopt a constitutional
text if not to memorialize its then-understood meaning as organic law.").
21 During President Reagan's administration, the Department of Justice was reported to have used fidelity
to originalist interpretive method as an important factor in federal judicial nominations. O'NEILL, supra note
9, at 146. President Reagan's nomination of then-Circuit Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court brought
arguments over originalism into the realm of popular public debate, and the question whether a judge will
"strictly interpret the Constitution" is now common fare at all Supreme Court confirmation hearings. See, e.g.,
Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091300979.html (Senator Grassley asking
then-Judge Roberts whether he would uphold decisions "which [he] found not to be based on the original
intent of the Constitution"); see also Comm'n on Pres. Debates, Unofficial Debate Transcript: The First Gore-
Bush Presidential Debate (Oct. 3, 2000), http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000a.html (George W. Bush
stating, "Voters will know I'll put competent judges on the bench, people who will strictly interpret the
Constitution and will not use the bench to write social policy"); U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on
Judge Samuel Alito's Nomination to the Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2006, http:/www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/10/AR2006011001418.htm (Senator Graham asking
then-Judge Alito whether he was a "strict constructionist").
22 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 280 (1990) (suggesting that all theories
of constitutional interpretation are in some sense originalist); Barnett, supra note 16, at 613 (asserting that
originalism is now the "prevailing approach to constitutional interpretation"). For a succinct account of the
considerable influence of originalism on contemporary constitutional law, see Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 3-9.
23 Thomas Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 711-12 (1974)
[hereinafter Grey, Unwritten Constitution].
24 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
25 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497,499 (1954).
26 Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (holding that unequal weighting of votes by county-unit
system used in statewide primary for nomination to the Senate violates fundamental principle of political
equality implicit in the Fifteenth Amendment). Compare Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964)
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of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses are the same.
27
An originalist defense of Fifth Amendment substantive due process, therefore,
would create a presumption that this doctrine is likewise encompassed by the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, thereby
dramatically altering the interpretive landscape surrounding the latter clause.
In that event, opponents of substantive due process would no longer be able to
passively stand on the entrenched conventional wisdom that the earlier clause
is merely procedural, but would have to affirmatively explain how and why an
understanding of due process that encompassed the protection of substantive
unenumerated rights in 1791 came to be abandoned in favor of an
understanding that confined such protection to procedural rights in 1868. And
finally, an originalist defense of Fifth Amendment substantive due process
would demonstrate that originalism is not inconsistent with the progressive,
common law recognition and protection of individual rights championed by the
Supreme Court since the mid-twentieth century.
Critics of the historical argument for Fifth Amendment substantive due
28 29process, as well as its less numerous supporters, have largely overlooked
the interpretive significance of both public-meaning originalism and the
reception of the classical natural law tradition in late eighteenth-century
America. For example, some critics have argued that substantive due process
is founded on a mistaken understanding of the original meaning of the
(holding that malapportioned congressional districts violate Article l's requirement that the House be elected
"by the People"), with LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-3, at 1064 (2d ed. 1988)
(criticizing Wesberry's location of this right in Article I as "historically dubious").
27 See, e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part);
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,80 (1873);
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 204; 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 8, at 1102-03; ELY,
supra note 8, at 15; MEYER, supra note 8, at 125; Roscoe Pound, The Development of Constitutional
Guarantees of Liberty (pt. 1), 20 NOTRE DAME LAW. 183, 184 (1945); Reeder, supra note 8, at 194.
28 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
29 See, e.g., CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
ch. 18 (1997); James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive
Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315 (1999) [hereinafter Ely, Oxymoron Reconsidered]; Grey, Unwritten
Constitution, supra note 23, at 711-12; Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental
Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978) [hereinafter Grey, Fundamental Law];
Alfred Hill, The Political Dimension of Constitutional Adjudication, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1237, 1270-73, 1322-
23 (1990); Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIs. L. REV. 941; cf Suzanna Sherry, The
Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1132 (1987) (arguing that the founders
understood certain natural and customary rights to be binding as constitutional law and enforceable by courts
despite their lack of enumeration in the Constitution or Bill of Rights).
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thirteenth-century Magna Carta in which the norm of due process is rooted. 3
But whether those who developed substantive due process misunderstood the
original meaning of Magna Carta is irrelevant: public-meaning originalism
specifies that the meaning of a constitutional text is its public meaning at the
time it was drafted and ratified, but does not demand that this public meaning
be historically accurate. Critics and supporters have also generally ignored the
classical natural law tradition's normative definition of "law," despite this
tradition's powerful influence during the founding era and its crucial relevance
to that era's understanding of state law-of-the-land clauses and the federal Due
Process Clause. The legal literature contains only two comprehensive
examinations of late eighteenth-century judicial decisions and other authorities
bearing on the original meaning of the "due process of law" in the Fifth
Amendment, 31 neither of which considers these authorities in light of the now-
dominant originalism of public meaning or the classical definition of law. This
Article fills these gaps.
I argue that one widely shared understanding of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment in the late eighteenth century encompassed judicial
recognition and enforcement of unenumerated substantive rights as a limit on
congressional power. The concept of due process as a substantive limitation
on government originated in thirteenth-century England with the "law of the
land" clause of Magna Carta.32  Although Magna Carta fell into disuse in
succeeding centuries, Sir Edward Coke revived it as the centerpiece of a
"higher law" constitutionalism, which held that natural and other rights
customarily recognized and enforced at common law constituted fundamental
limits on assertions of crown prerogatives (and, perhaps, on parliamentary
lawmaking as well). 33 This higher-law constitutionalism is evident in Coke's
writing, as well as in the seventeenth-century identification of natural law with
common law.
34
30 See, e.g., Berger, "Law of the Land," supra note 8, at 221-44; Jurow, Untimely Thoughts, supra note
8, at 279.
31 See Berger, "Law of the Land," supra note 8, at 221-44 (concluding that due process limitations were
never understood to limit legislative power, and that no sound late eighteenth-century authority supports the
view that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause authorized the federal judiciary to protect unenumerated
substantive rights against congressional encroachment); Riggs, supra note 29, at 973-74 (concluding that
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century authorities support the view that the framers intended the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause to protect unenumerated substantive rights against congressional
encroachment).
32 See infra Part I.B.
3 See infra Part I.B.I.
34 See infra Part I.B.2.
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Coke's reading of substance into due process was adopted by the American
colonies and adapted to their struggle against Britain in the 1760s and 1770s.
35
The English Civil War, the Interregnum, and the Glorious Revolution resulted
in England's eventual abandonment of natural and customary rights as
constitutional limitations on the king and Parliament, in favor of a
constitutional understanding that limited the king by vesting full sovereignty in
Parliament. 36  Higher-law constitutionalism, however, lived on in the
American colonies. Indeed, the clash of these two conflicting understandings
of the English constitution lay at the heart of the American Revolution.
37
When the colonies declared themselves independent in 1776, they
reconstituted the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of their
republican governments by means of written constitutional documents, 38 but
left natural and customary rights where they had always been-under the
protection of higher-law constitutionalism, 39 as is evident from judicial
decisions and arguments of counsel in the years following independence.
40
The subsequent drafting and ratification of the federal Constitution in 1787
followed the same pattern.
The eighteenth-century American adoption of seventeenth-century English
higher-law constitutionalism is the necessary backdrop for the argument that
the doctrine of substantive due process was within the original understanding
of the Fifth Amendment. It is evident from the ratification controversy over
the Constitution's initial lack of a bill of rights that late eighteenth-century
Americans understood natural and customary rights to be invested with an
existence and normative force as "higher" or "constitutional" law that did not
42depend upon their enumeration in a written constitution. Although the sparse
legislative history of the drafting and ratification of the Fifth Amendment
43
offers no insight into the meaning of the Due Process Clause, the Clause was
likely understood to protect natural and customary rights against congressional
action through a particular understanding of "law" inherited from the classical
natural law tradition.44 Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, and others in that tradition
5 See infra Part II.
36 See infra Part II.A.
3 See infra Part IlB.
38 See infra Part II.C.2.
'9 See infra Part II.C. 1.
40 See infra Part 1I.C.3.
41 See infra Part lI.D.
42 See infra Part Ill.
41 See infra Part M.A.
44 See infra Part II1.B.
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maintained that an unjust law was not really a "law," 45 and American judges
and attorneys in the late eighteenth century understood "law" in this restrictive
manner-as having a normative content beyond mere positivist compliance
with the rule of recognition. Legislative acts that violated natural or customary
rights, therefore, were not considered to be actual "laws," irrespective of their
compliance with written constitutional prescriptions for the creation of positive
law. Accordingly, deprivations of life, liberty, or property effected on the
authority of such acts were not understood to comply with the "law" of the
land or the due process of "law," because they were not accomplished in
accordance with a true "law," regardless of the process the acts afforded. If a
congressional act were not truly a "law," in other words, deprivations
accomplished pursuant to that act did not satisfy the Fifth Amendment's
requirement that deprivations be accomplished in accordance with the due
process of "law."
The classical understanding of "law" in the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause is evident in legal dictionaries and in judicial decisions and arguments
of counsel during the years immediately before and after ratification of the Bill
46
of Rights in 1791, and criticisms of it are irrelevant or unpersuasive on
originalist grounds.47 On balance, there is sufficient historical evidence to
support the conclusion that at least one common, public understanding of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment at the time it was ratified in 1791
was that it protected unenumerated natural and customary rights against
encroachment by Congress.48
I. MAGNA CARTA, SIR EDWARD COKE, AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY DUE
PROCESS
A. Due Process and Magna Carta
It is universally agreed that the concept of "due process of law" is rooted in
Magna Carta, or the "Great Charter," which was forced upon John I by a group
of feudal barons at Runnymede in 1215. Without doubt the most influential
provision of Magna Carta has been the "law of the land" clause of Chapter 29:
"No free man shall be arrested or imprisoned, or disseised or outlawed or
41 See infra Part III.B.I.
46 See infra Part III.B.2.
41 See infra Part III.C.
48 See infra Conclusion.
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exiled or in any way victimized, neither will we attack him or send anyone to
attack him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land. 4 9  Chapter 29 assumed the form that would influence centuries of
Anglo-American jurisprudence following six parliamentary reaffirmation
statutes enacted during the reign of Edward III in the fourteenth century.
50
These reaffirmation statutes memorialized a critical understanding of
Chapter 29 that defined the "law of the land" as the "due process of law," or
"procedure by original writ or by an indicting jury," 5' verbal formulations that
suggested substantive as well as procedural protection. 52 These reaffirmations
also confirmed that the "lawful judgment of his peers" meant trial by jury, and
that Chapter 29 protected "all persons" of "whatever estate or condition." 53
The Charter and its many reaffirmations during the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries coincided with the rise of the English common law and the
royal courts. Because these courts had a national jurisdiction, they displaced
the many manorial, shire, and other local courts, and their decisions came to be
known as the "common law of England."5 4 Indeed, the classic definition of the
"common law"-"the law and customs common to the whole kingdom of
England, . . . administered by a centralized court system with nationwide
49 Magna Carta (1215 & 1225), reprinted in RALPH V. TURNER, MAGNA CARTA THROUGH THE AGES
app. at 226, 231 (2003). References to this clause here and elsewhere in this Article are to Chapter 29 of the
1225 version of the Charter affirmed by Henry II, which is preferred by historians over Chapter 39 of the 1215
version subsequently repudiated by John. See GEORGE BURTON ADAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 138 (1934); HELEN M. CAM, MAGNA CARTA-EVENT OR DOCUMENT? 3, 13 (1965); J.C. HOLT,
MAGNA CARTA 393-94 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter HOLT, MAGNA CARTA].
50 The question whether the agreement of any king to the provisions of Magna Carta bound his
successors was dealt with by regular reaffirmation of Magna Carta, by the crown in coronation charters, and
later by Parliament in enacted statutes. ADAMS, supra note 49, at 130-31.
51 HOLT, MAGNA CARTA, supra note 49, at 10; A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA 15 (rev. ed. 1998).
52 See, e.g., FRANK R. STRONG, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND
NONSENSE 4-5 (1986) (arguing that the existence in Magna Carta of remedies for dispossession of feudal
estates "would seem to resolve in the affirmative the question whether chapter [2]9 was intended to protect
substantive property rights"); Riggs, supra note 29, at 956-57 ("Finding substantive overtones in the
Edwardian statutes is consistent with the position of McKechnie, Holdsworth and Thompson, among others,
that in the fourteenth century 'due process of law' and 'law of the land' were essentially equivalent terms
having substantive as well as procedural content.").
53 CAM, supra note 49, at 18-19; HOLT, MAGNA CARTA, supra note 49, at 10.
54 ADAMS, supra note 49, at 135-36; S.H. BAILEY & M.J. GUNN, SMITH AND BAILEY ON THE MODERN
ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 4 (3d ed. 1996); C.H. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CHANGING WORLD
86, 88 (1939); GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, ENGLISH LAW 3 (2000); David A. Thomas, Origins of the
Common Law: Common Law Under the Early Normans (pt. 3), 1986 BYU L. REV. 109, 120-22.
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competence" 55-points to the origins of common law in the displacement of
baronial courts by royal courts.
56
Both Magna Carta and the common law came to be viewed as remnants of
a romanticized ancient Saxon legal tradition ruptured by the Norman
invasion. 57 The coincidence of widespread belief in the ancient roots of the
Charter's rights and remedies with purported discovery by royal courts of a
similarly ancient common law indelibly linked the Charter and the common
law in the English legal tradition.58 This association proved to be critical
because, in medieval and early modern England, the common law was
understood to be the "constitution of the kingdom."59  By the end of the
fourteenth century, the "myth of Magna Carta" was well-entrenched in English
legal culture: Magna Carta declared fundamental English law, 60 meaning that
the rights and remedies it declared against the king formed part of the common
law.
61
B. Coke and the Deployment of Due Process Against the Crown (and
Parliament?)
Magna Carta originated as a limitation on the crown, which exercised the
primary lawmaking authority in the thirteenth century through royal decrees
and judgments of the king's courts.62 It was precisely this understanding of
Magna Carta as a check on royal power that Sir Edward Coke and others
championed against the absolutism of the Stuart kings. One of the crucial
stories behind substantive due process is how Magna Carta, the due process of
law, and the common law evolved into "fundamental" or "higher law"
55 Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (pt. 1), 2 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J.
155, 157 (2002) [hereinafter Postema, Classical Common Law].
56 See MCILWAIN, supra note 54, at 140.
57 See, e.g., CAM, supra note 49, at 7; MCILWAIN, supra note 54, at 172; Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher
Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pt. 1), 42 HARv. L. REV. 149, 170 (1928) [hereinafter
Corwin, "Higher Law" Background]; Thomas, supra note 54, at 122-25.
58 See ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 79-80 (1966); MCILWAIN, supra note 54, at
127.
59 Postema, Classical Common Law, supra note 55, at 155.
60 HOLT, MAGNA CARTA, supra note 49, at 14; HOWARD, supra note 51, at 24; MCILWAIN, supra note
54, at 172, 174.
61 CAM, supra note 49, at 17, 20; MCILWAIN, supra note 54, at 135; Corwin, "Higher Law" Background,
supra note 57, at 179.
62 Ely, Oxymoron Reconsidered, supra note 29, at 320; Corwin, "Higher Law" Background, supra note
57, at 168.
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limitations on royal and parliamentary power in early seventeenth-century
England.
1. "Higher Law" Constitutionalism
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the energetic rule of the Tudor
monarchs loosened the customary restraints on royal power represented by
63
common law (including Magna Carta) and Parliament. By the late sixteenth
century, Chapter 29 and the rest of the Charter had fallen into disuse, rendered
apparently obsolete by the Tudors' many accretions of power.64 When the first
Stuart king, James I, took the throne, he sought to formalize and consolidate
this shift of power to the king.65 In particular, James maintained that the king
could not be subject to law, because law was merely a means of executing the
royal will.
66
To combat James's assertion of royal absolutism, Coke resurrected and
extended the "myth of Magna Carta"-the traditional (and historically
dubious) belief that Magna Carta declared ancient legal constraints on royal
power.67 The argument that Magna Carta limited the royal prerogative was
based on a simple syllogism:
1. Magna Carta declared the existence of fundamental English laws
and customs that formed part of the common law;
2. By ruling the kingdom in violation of these laws and customs,
King John had been a tyrant;
3. Therefore, any ruler who failed to observe Magna Carta likewise
violated the common law and was similarly guilty of tyrannous
behavior.
68
63 See Pound, supra note 27, at 208.
64 ADAMS, supra note 49, at 142; see HOLT, MAGNA CARTA, supra note 49, at 1I, 396.
65 See ADAMS, supra note 49, at 265; Grey, Fundamental Law, supra note 29, at 851; see also Pound,
supra note 27, at 214 ("James I and his successors undertook to set up in England an absolute monarchy after
the fashion of the Continent.").
66 See FREDERICK GEORGE MARCHAM, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN ENGLAND, 1485 TO
THE PRESENT 121 (1960).
67 CAM, supra note 49, at 20-21; THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETI, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 49, 51, 282 (5th ed. 1956); Grey, Fundamental Law, supra note 29, at 851-52; Bernadette Meyler,
Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 584-85 (2006); Paul Raffield, Contract,
Classicism, and the Common-Weal: Coke's Reports and the Foundations of the Modem English Constitution,
17 L. & Lrr. 69,90 (2005).
68 HOLT, MAGNA CARTA, supra note 49, at 403.
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Coke put this syllogism to good use, using it to characterize Magna Carta
as a "higher law" which safeguarded important English liberties held by all
subjects of the realm. 69 By treating Magna Carta and the liberties it declared as
possessed of a more fundamental status than ordinary law, Coke meant to
invest Magna Carta with a place in the English system that was prior to and
more foundational than the actions of the king or, perhaps, even Parliament.
70
In Coke's view, the English constitution did not vest sovereignty in the
king or any of the estates,71 but in the common law and the courts.72  Magna
Carta and common law liberties constituted law that was "higher" than the
actions of the king or estates, law that policed their interactions and limited
what they could do even by consensus. 73  As Professor Grey summarized,
Parliament, the king, and his courts "all were thought of as institutions
controlled by an overarching fundamental law to which they were all jointly
responsible. 74 Coke not only revived the myth of Magna Carta, therefore, he
also reinterpreted it to provide for broader and more substantive protection of
75individual liberty. This recasting of the ancient myth is evident in Coke's
confrontation with James over the respective jurisdictions of common law and
ecclesiastical courts, in judicial opinions authored or reported by Coke-
notably Bonham's Case and several anti-monopoly cases-and, most clearly,
in Coke's monumental Institutes of the Law of England, published at the end of
his life.
'9 id. at 9.
70 See JAMES STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, HOBBES, AND THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 27 (1992) [hereinafter STONER, LIBERAL THEORY]; Grey, Fundamental Law,
supra note 29, at 858; see also Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional
Law (pt. 2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 365, 367 (1928) [hereinafter Corwin, "Higher Law" Background (pt. 2)]
("[Coke's] basic doctrine was 'that the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows."'
(quoting Proclamations, (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, 1354 (K.B.))).
71 England in the early seventeenth century understood itself to have a "mixed monarchy," which meant
that the king governed only with the consensus of the three traditional English social classes or "estates"-
royalty, represented in Parliament by the king; nobility and clergy, represented in Parliament by the "lords
temporal and spiritual"; and the people, represented in Parliament by the Commons. Thomas G. Barnes,
Introduction to Coke's "Commentary on Littleton" (1995), in LAW, LIBERTY, AND PARLIAMENT: SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 1, 21 (Allen D. Boyer ed., 2004) [hereinafter ESSAYS ON
COKE].
72 JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 24-25 (2003); Corwin, "Higher Law"
Background (pt. 2), supra note 70, at 367; Raffield, supra note 67, at 73, 78-79.
73 See MARCHAM, supra note 66, at 122; Barnes, supra note 71, at 21.
74 Grey, Fundamental Law, supra note 29, at 855.
75 HOLT, MAGNA CARTA, supra note 49, at 12; Alan Cromartie, The Constitutionalist Revolution: The
Transformation of Political Culture in Early Stuart England, 163 PAST & PRESENT 76, 80 (1999).
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a. Writs of Prohibition
Although Coke is best known as a common law judge, his earliest
statement of higher-law constitutionalism did not appear in a judicial opinion,
but in accounts of an audience of all the judges of the Court of Common Pleas
demanded by James. The Archbishop of Canterbury had complained to the
King about "writs of prohibition" issued by Coke and other common law
judges against attempts by ecclesiastical courts to take or retain equity
jurisdiction of cases that could have been filed in common law courts.7 6 In an
argument that doubtless appealed to the absolutist James, the Archbishop
maintained that in questions of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, "the King himself
may decide it in his Royall person; and that the Judges are but the delegates of
the King, and that the King may take what Causes he shall please to determine,
from the determination of the Judges, and may determine them himself.,
77
Coke describes himself as having refuted this argument with an erudite
explanation replete with citations to prior decisions, maxims, and other
common law authorities. 78  James was not persuaded, responding that "he
thought the Law was founded upon reason, and that he and others had reason,
as well as the Judges. 79 In reply, Coke acknowledged that "God had endowed
his Majesty with excellent Science, and great endowments of nature,"8 but
insisted that James
was not learned in the Lawes of his Realm of England, and causes
which concern the life, inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his
Subjects; they are not to be decided by naturall reason but by the
artificial reason and judgment of Law, which Law is an act which
76 Prohibitions del Roy, (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (C.P.), reprinted in 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF
EDWARD COKE 478 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003); see CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE
THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE (1552-1634), at 295, 302-03 (1956); Cromartie, supra
note 75, at 89.
77 Prohibitions del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1342, reprinted in 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE
479 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003); see also BOWEN, supra note 76, at 300-01 (describing how this argument was
foreshadowed by Lord Ellesmere's argument in the litigation of Calvin's Case); Cromartie, supra note 75, at
90 (observing that a significant source of tension between the common law and the church courts "stemmed
from the theological commitment among a growing faction of the clergy to an autonomous church polity
whose fate was ultimately controlled by king-in-Convocation, not king-in-Parliament").
78 Prohibitions del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1342-43, reprinted in I THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD
COKE 479-80 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003); see also BOWEN, supra note 76, at 303-04.
79 Prohibitions del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1343, reprinted in I THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE
481 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
80 id.
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requires long study and experience, before that a man can attain to
the cognizance of it.
8 1
An enraged James accused Coke of treason for suggesting that the King was
subordinate to law, to which Coke coolly (at least in his own account) quoted




Just two years later, Coke seemed to declare that higher-law
constitutionalism limited Parliament as well as the crown. Dr. Bonham's Case
involved the imprisonment of Thomas Bonham by the London College of
Physicians for unlicensed practice of medicine in violation of the college's
royal charter. 83 Bonham brought an action for false imprisonment against the
members of the college. 84  The defendants pleaded in defense "Letters
Patents"-a royal grant pursuant to which the King had given the college
exclusive power to license practitioners of medicine within the city of London,
with the power to fine and imprison those who practiced without the college's
license. 85 The grant, moreover, had been twice confirmed by parliamentary
act. 86 As Professor Orth has observed, this grant and its confirmations meant
that the "law in this case was not merely the product of custom but had been
solemnly adopted by the highest political powers in the state."
87
The court found for Bonham by construing the grant to have given the
college the power to imprison only for malpractice, and not for mere
unlicensed practice. 88 There being no evidence of malpractice by Bonham-he
81 Id. Coke's argument here echoes Fortescue and other medieval jurists. See Corwin, "Higher Law"
Background, supra note 57, at 182.
82 Prohibitions del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1343, reprinted in I THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE
481 & n.8 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
83 Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 650 (K.B.), reprinted in I THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF
EDWARD COKE 264, 268-70 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
84 Id. at 646, reprinted in I THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE 265 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
85 Id. at 647-48, reprinted in I THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE 265-67 (Steve Sheppard ed.,
2003).
86 Id., reprinted in I THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE 266 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
87 ORTH, supra note 72, at 23.
88 Bonhan's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 647-48, 651-52, reprinted in I THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF
EDWARD COKE 273-75 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
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had a medical degree from Cambridge-the court held that the King had not
authorized the college to imprison him.
89
Coke, however, went further. Since the royal grant specified that the
college retained a portion of the fines it levied for unlicensed practice, Coke
argued that the college was interested in the outcome of the cases of unlicensed
practice that it judged; the college was, in other words, a judge in its own case,
in violation of longstanding English law and custom:
The Censors, cannot be Judges, Ministers, and parties; Judges, to
give sentence or judgment; Ministers to make summons; and Parties,
to have the moyety of the forfeiture [i.e., one-half of the fine],
because no one ought to be a judge in his own cause, it is wrong to
be the judge of his own property; and one cannot be Judge and
Attorney for any of the parties. And it appeareth in our Books, that
in many Cases, the Common Law doth controll Acts of Parliament,
and somtimes shall adjudge them to be void: for when an Act of
Parliament is against Common right and reason, or repugnant, or
impossible to be performed, the Common Law will controll it, and
adjudge such act to be void.90
Coke's dictum, that judges could void government acts contrary to
fundamental common law, is evident in other decisions he authored, 91 and was
affirmed by his immediate successor on Common Pleas, 92 and by the Chief
Justice of King's Bench nearly a century later.
93
Even so, disagreement persists over whether Coke really meant what he
appeared to have said.94 Most commentators have concluded that Coke merely
89 Id. at 650-51, reprinted in I THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE 272-73 (Steve Sheppard ed.,
2003).
90 Id. at 652 (author's translation from Latin in italics) (internal citation omitted), reprinted in 1 THE
SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE 275 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
91 See, e.g., James Bagg's Case, (1615) 77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1279 (K.B.) (citing Magna Carta to require a
conviction "by course of Law" before a "Free-man" can be removed by a corporation), reprinted in I THE
SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE 404, 415 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003); Clark's Case, (1596) 77 Eng.
Rep. 152 (C.P.) (holding that, under Magna Carta, a town may not impose imprisonment under a bylaw),
reprinted in I THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE 134 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
92 See Day v. Savadge, (1614) 80 Eng. Rep. 235, 237 (C.P.) (per Hobart, J.) ("[B]ecause even an Act of
Parliament, made against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in his own case, is void in it self .....
93 See City of London v. Wood, (1703) 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1603 (K.B.) (per Holt, C.J.).
94 See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BILL
OF RIGHTS 55 (expanded ed. 1992) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS] ("Coke did not mean to assert
the theory of a fundamental connon law empowering the courts to nullify statutes ...."); Haines, supra note
8, at 389 ("There is no indication, except in some of the implications of the language of Coke, that the
provision was intended to serve as a limitation on the powers of Parliament.").
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stated a rule of construction. 95 Others, however, insist that Coke's dictum is
broader and more significant,96 especially because it came hard on the heels of
Coke's dangerous insistence to James that the king was subject to law. Coke's
opinion did not merely argue that the college's conflict of interest denied
Bonham a fair trial before an impartial decision maker, but pressed the further
position that actions of Parliament that effect unwarranted deprivations of
substantive liberty, such as granting to a private group monopoly powers over
a lawful calling, are limited by fundamental law.9 7 As Orth has argued:
Coke had been defending not only Dr. Bonham's right to a fair trial
but also the law's supremacy over the powers that be .... Coke was
trying to give content to the law's restraint on power; that is, he was
trying to give substance to due process. There were, he thought,
things that the supreme power in the state, even the king in
Parliament, could not lawfully do, no matter how hard he tried.
98
c. Royal Monopolies
In Bonham's Case, Coke argued that the Royal College's licensing
authority was a monopoly that violated the freedom of English subjects to
practice lawful trades and professions without interference by the crown.
9 9
This argument reflected the general seventeenth-century understanding that
grants of royal monopolies over so-called "ordinary trades or callings" violate
the common law.
The English kings had long exercised political control and raised revenue
by granting to royal favorites the exclusive right to provide certain goods or
95 See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 94, at 55 ('The modem consensus is that the
passage states a canon of construction rather than a constitutional theory."); S.E. THORNE, ESSAYS IN ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 276-77 (1985) ('These cases, then, support no theory of higher law, binding upon Parliament
and making Acts that contravene it void.").
96 See, e.g., STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 58 ("To read the famous sentence in Bonham's
as an instance of 'mere' statutory construction is too narrow an interpretation. Such a concept ... presumes a
distinction between construing statutes and voiding them that [Coke] does not acknowledge.").
97 PLUCKNETT, supra note 67, at 51.
98 ORTH, supra note 72, at 29.
99 See Harold J. Cook, Against Common Right and Reason: The College of Physicians Versus Dr.
Thomas Bonham, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 301, 320 (1985) ("[Coke] seems to have seen the [Royal] College [of
Physicians] as a strange combination of two kinds of bodies: an economic monopoly and a learned fraternity.
As a learned fraternity, he had no dispute with the College's charter. But as an economic monopoly, he found
no justification for a small group of learned physicians trying to restrict the practices of others, particularly
university-trained physicians.").
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services.100 By the early seventeenth century, these royal monopolies were
completely out of control, subjecting large numbers of people to fines and
imprisonment merely for pursuing common trades or businesses.
1 1
The crown's practice of granting such monopolies came under attack in
Darcy v. Allen, also known as the Case of Monopolies, where the court
invalidated a royal monopoly on playing cards, observing that monopolies
violate the common law by interfering with "the liberty of the subject" to
pursue ordinary trades, damaging other subjects by raising the price and
diminishing the quality of the monopolized product or service, and depriving
subjects of an otherwise lawful means of earning a living. 10 2  The court
elaborated its holding and rationale in a subsequent monopoly decision,
observing that "at the Common Law no man might be forbidden to work in any
lawful Trade, for the Law doth abhor idleness, the mother of all evil," and thus
"the Common Law doth abhor all Monopolies, which forbid any one to work
in any lawful Trade .. ,,103 The court went on to hold that restraints imposed
by a trade guild on someone who had in fact served his apprenticeship were
"against the Freedom and Liberty of the Subject, and are a means of Extortion




Coke confirmed the preeminent constitutional place of Magna Carta and
common law in the Institutes of the Lawes of England, his monumental effort
to demonstrate the continuity of seventeenth-century common law with
1oo See ADAMS, supra note 49, at 280 (describing the state of the English royal monopoly system under
the Tudors and Stuarts).
'o' See id. ("By this time so undeniable were the abuses complained of that the king made no attempt to
prevent parliament from dealing with them."); BOWEN, supra note 76, at 172 (detailing the conflict between
the monarchy and the "Parliament of the Monopolies"); STRONG, supra note 52, at 8, 11 (describing the
awarding of privileges under Elizabeth I and James I); THORNE, supra note 95, at 228, 229 ("The
system ... was open to abuses of the gravest kind.").
102 Case of Monopolies, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.), reprinted in I THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF
EDWARD COKE 394, 395-96, 398-400 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
103 Case of the Tailors of Ipswich, (1614) 77 Eng. Rep. 1218, 1218-20 (K.B.), reprinted in I THE
SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE 390, 391-93 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003); see also Raffield, supra note
67, at 87 (observing that the natural law "abhorred idleness because it was synonymous with disorder").
io4 Tailors, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1220, reprinted in 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE 390, 394
(Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
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pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon law at the dawn of English history. 0 5 In the First
Institute, published in 1628, six years before his death, 106 Coke characterized
the rights and remedies of Magna Carta as both ancient and constitutionally
supreme. 10 7  More radically, Coke declared that judgments and statutes
contrary to the Charter "are adjudged voide," thereby making Magna Carta
fundamental and preeminent English law.' °8 In Coke's view, Magna Carta did
not merely confirm and restore the common law, but also declared the bedrock
constitutional principle that the common law bound and limited both the crown
and Parliament-a view that Coke emphatically and publicly reaffirmed in the
debates surrounding the drafting and execution of the Petition of Right,
Parliament's declaration of fundamental common law liberties enacted as a
statutory bill under Coke's influence in 1628.'1°
Coke reaffirmed these principles in the Second Institute, written in the early
1630s but not published until after his death. 110 He again maintained that
Chapter 29 and Magna Carta generally were declarations of the ancient rights
of Englishmen, and thus limits on the actions of both the king and
105 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND: OR A
COMMENTARY UPON LITrLETON (London, Society of Stationers 1628), excerpted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS
OF EDWARD COKE 577 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) [hereinafter FIRST INSTITUTE].
106 id.
107 Id. § 108, at 697.
108 Id. at 697-98.
109 JOHN FULTON [S.M. JOHNSON, pseud.], FREE GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA: CONTAINING
THE GREAT CHARTER, THE PETITION OF RIGHT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 325, 328
(New York, Carleton 1864); see STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 45-47. A provision in earlier
drafts of the Petition expressly affirmed the "sovereign power" of the king, which Coke famously condemned
as inconsistent with the higher-law understanding of Magna Carta as a fundamental limit on both royal and
parliamentary power:
I know that prerogative is a part of the law, but sovereign power is no Parliamentary word.
Should we now add it, we shall weaken the foundation of law and then the building must needs
fall. Take heed what we yield unto! Magna Charta is such a fellow that he will have no
sovereign. I wonder this 'sovereign' was not in Magna Charta, or in the confirmation of it? If
we grant this, by implication we give a sovereign power above all these laws.
BOWEN, supra note 76, at 496 (quoting Coke). In higher constitutional theory, natural and customary rights
bound the king regardless of whether they were enumerated in a writing like the Petition. In practice,
however, these rights were obviously more secure when the king formally agreed to observe them, as in the
Petition. The Anti-Federalists made an analogous argument for the Bill of Rights, arguing that a constitutional
declaration of natural and customary rights would make them more secure. See infra text accompanying note
283.
Ito EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (London, Flesher
& Young 1642), excerpted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE 745 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003)
[hereinafter SECOND INSTITUTE].
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Parliament."'1 It was also in the Second Institute that Coke clearly equated the
law of the land with the due process of law.112 Moreover, Coke characterized
Chapter 29's prohibition of deprivations and forfeitures inconsistent with the
law of the land or the due process of law as having clear substantive import,
being declaratory of ancient English law that a person's liberty shall be
infringed only when such infringements are justified by "the Common Law,
Statute Law, or Custome of England."' 13 The liberty protected by Chapter 29,
according to Coke, "signifieth the freedomes, that the Subjects of England
have,"' 14 meaning substantive as well as procedural rights.
! 15
Coke also strengthened his argument against monopolies in the Second
Institute by replacing general recourse to the common law with the more
specific assertion that monopolies violate Chapter 29, l l6 a law "of definite
content and traceable back to one particular document of ancient and glorious
origin."' 1 7 Coke condemned the grant of royal monopolies for the manufacture
or provision of useful articles as a violation of the individual liberty protected
by Magna Carta:
So likewise, and for the same reason, if a graunt be made to any man,
to have the sole making of Cards, or the sole dealing with any other
trade, that graunt is against the liberty, and freedome of the Subject,
Id. at745,751-52.
112 Id. at 858-59. "Law of the Land" is defined by reference to one of the six statutes wherein the phrase
is defined as "due process of Law," and further glossed as
by indictment of presentment of good and lawfull men, where such deeds be done in due manner,
or by writ originall of the Common law.
Without being brought in to answere but by due Proces of the Common law.
No man be put to answer without presentment before Justices, or thing of record, or by due
proces, or by writ originall, according the old law of the land.
Id.; see also ORTH, supra note 72, at 7-8 ("[T]he 'law of the land,' Coke said, meant the common law, and the
common law required 'due process."'); STRONG, supra note 52, at 14 (asserting that Coke "gave permanence
to the concept of 'due process by law' by asserting its equivalence to per legem terrae of chapter 29 of Magna
Carta").
113 SECOND INSTITUTE ch. 29, supra note 110, at 849.
114 Id. at 851; accord I THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE 249 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
115 See HOWARD, supra note 51, at 23 ("Magna Carta's power lay... in the symbolism and moral force
that it carried for later times, an influence so great that by the seventeenth century the best-read of lawyers
traced almost anything that was worthy and good back to the Charter, including trial by jury, habeas corpus,
and Parliament's right to control taxation."); STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 21 (asserting that
Coke's use of Magna Carta to refer "specifically to the freedom of subjects from interference in basic pursuits"
points to its use "to comprehend the whole of the fundamental laws of the realm").
116 See, e.g., SECOND INSTITUTE ch. 29, supra note 110, at 851.
117 Corwin, "Higher Law" Background (pt. 2), supra note 70, at 378.
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that before did, or lawfully might have used that trade, and
consequently against this great Charter. 118
Coke did not attack monopolies because of the manner in which they
deprived individuals of their right to practice a trade or calling, but rather for
the deprivation itself. In language foreshadowing the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, Coke emphasized that a man's trade is his life, and "therefore
the monopolist that taketh away a mans trade, taketh away his life."" 9 The
violation of Chapter 29 lies not in the fact that monopolies deprive individuals
of life or property without trial by jury or other legal process, but in the fact
that monopolies effect such deprivations at all. Thus, Coke flatly declared,
"Generally all monopolies are against this great Charter, because they are
against the liberty and freedome of the Subject, and against the Law of the
Land."
, 120
2. Natural Law and Common Law
Coke's invocation of "common right and reason" in Bonham's Case had a
natural law resonance that is not as immediately apparent today. Although
during the late medieval and early modem eras it was widely maintained that
the common law somehow reflected or incorporated natural law principles,'
21
common law decisions generally did not make explicit natural law arguments
or otherwise expressly refer to the natural law. 122 The natural law entered into
118 SECOND INSTITUTE ch. 29, supra note 110, at 851.
119 EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH
TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 181 (Lawbook Exchange 2002) (1644).
120 SECOND INSTITUTE ch. 29, supra note 110, at 852.
Coke also condemned the practice by which kings (and occasionally Parliament) sought to rid
themselves of troublesome political opponents by appointing them to posts outside of England. Acceptance of
the appointment took the appointee (conveniently) out of English politics, while refusal triggered punitive
forfeiture of lands and privileges, and sometimes even imprisonment. Coke argued that this practice and its
associated penalties constituted a "banishment" or "exile" that violated the plain language of Chapter 29 when
imposed without a prior felony conviction. As with monopolies, the crux of the violation of Chapter 29 was
not lack of process when a royal appointee incurred penalties upon rejection of the appointment, but rather the
penalties themselves. Id. at 852-53; see BOWEN, supra note 76, at 482 (detailing the efforts of Coke and
others in Parliament to champion subjects' rights against imprisonment without cause).
121 Postema, Classical Common Law, supra note 55, at 176-77; see NORMAN DOE, FUNDAMENTAL
AUTHORITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAW 3-5 (1990) (describing how "[miorality, of divine origin" was
incorporated into English law); Cromartie, supra note 75, at 81-82, 84 (stating that "decisions by the bench
had taken natural law into account"); Richard O'Sullivan, The Natural Law and Common Law, 3 U. NOTRE
DAME NAT. L. INST. PROC. 9, 19-20, 29, 32 (1950).
122 DOE, supra note 121, at 176; Postema, Classical Common Law, supra note 55, at 177-78; Pound,
supra note 27, at 228; Roscoe Pound, The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty (pt. 2), 20
NOTRE DAME LAW. 347, 364 (1945).
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the common law implicitly through the notion of resoun, an evocative Norman
French cognate of "reason," which combined notions of "rightness" and
"reasonableness" and was employed by judges and lawyers to describe the
essence of the common law.' 23 Usually rendered "reason" or "right reason,"
resoun conveyed at once the notion of a living community and its sense of
justice. 124 A decision that had "reason" or "right reason" was "fitting" in a
dual sense, both consistent with customary precedent, and expressive of a
morally correct outcome. 125  Indeed, in the classical common law tradition,
"reason" was sometimes understood as the equivalent of "justice."', 26  As
Professor Postema has observed, "reason" in the classical common law stood
for "the situated, experience-informed judgment of the judge using all the
resources the vast body of the law provides, thinking by analogy and extension
from all that he knows, to fashion a just and workable solution."'
127
Although this close relationship between the common law and the natural
law was widely assumed in the seventeenth century, the common lawyers
never formally explained it. They rhetorically grounded common law in both
custom and natural law without ever confronting the improbability of deriving
one from the other. 12 8 This problem became increasingly acute as the modem
123 H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 77 (1993); see
STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 173 (noting the classical common law maxim, "what is not
reason is not law"); Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (pt. 2), 3 OXFORD U.
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1, 21 (2003) [hereinafter Postema, Classical Common Law (pt. 2)] (arguing that in the
seventeenth century, the "artificial reason" of the common law "was seen largely as the most reliable
procedure for approximating" natural justice); see also CHRISTOPHER SAINT GERMAN, ST. GERMAN'S DOCTOR
AND STUDENT 33-35 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds., Selden Society 1974) (1523) (arguing that the first
ground of the law of England is the law of reason).
124 POWELL, supra note 123, at 78; see DOE, supra note 121, at 176 (arguing that an "idea[] of abstract
right" was implied by the "resemblance between the practitioners' reason, upon which the common law was
founded, and the theorists' justice, which required that each be given his due"; and observing that although
common lawyers rarely invoked the natural law, they employed "comparably moral ideas," appealing to
"conscience and ideas of divine law"); GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 7
(1986) [hereinafter POSTEMA, COMMON LAW TRADITION] ("Common Law is seen to be the expression or
manifestation of commonly shared values and conceptions of reasonableness and the common good.").
125 See POSTEMA, COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 124, at 7.
126 DOE, supra note 121, at 120; see also id. at 115 (noting that "reason" was deployed at common law for
substantially the same ends as equity was deployed in the chancery courts).
127 Postema, Classical Common Law, supra note 55, at 179; accord DOE, supra note 121, at 177 (arguing
that, for common lawyers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, "the authority of morality (manifested in
natural law, divine law, justice or conscience) and good sense and proportionality (manifested in reason) were
of crucial importance for the existence and development of law").
128 James Q. Whitman, Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason?, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1321, 1352-61 (1991); see POSTEMA, COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 124, at 35-36 (observing
that the common law conception of reason was "practical and historical; the 'natural law' involved is not
external to the tradition, but implicit in it, not socially transcendent, but immanent").
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era matured and natural law came to mean "deductive reasoning" rather than
"divine law" or "practical wisdom."'129  It is unclear, for example, how one
could derive the customary common law right to a jury trial from human
existence in the state of nature, or by any other form of deductive reasoning.
Coke shared the widespread and confused belief of his era that the common
law incorporated the natural law. 130 The concept of resoun was clearly at work
in Coke's understanding that certain common law rights and principles
constitute "higher law." Both Prohibitions del Roy and Bonham's Case, for
example, rested on resoun. As Coke was at pains to inform James, "reason" in
the common law was not the natural reason possessed by all humanity, but
rather an "artificial" reason developed by deep study and long experience in
the profession. 131 In Bonham's Case, Coke used the ubiquitous common law
Professor Whitman argues that this casual "mingling" of common law and natural law was the result of
an "evidentiary crisis of custom" in the late medieval and early modern eras. Whitman, supra, at 1323.
According to Whitman, the basic norm of both the continental and English legal systems was local custom. Id.
at 1329-40. As centralized courts replaced local courts, however, it became impossible for judges to consult
local witnesses to prove the local customs that governed the outcome of the cases before them. Id. at 1330-31,
1340-47, 1352-56.
Lacking local witnesses, early modem lawyers were forced to seek an alternative means of
determining custom. The alternative they chose was to blend customary and natural law into a
peculiar concoction, which they called the "common custom of the realm," and which they
embodied in treatises that could be consulted in lieu of consulting local witnesses. The
consequence was a thorough confusion of custom and reason ....
Id. at 1331.
Once the customs that grounded the common law were claimed to be reasonable, they could be proved
by recourse to reason rather than testimony. See, e.g., id. at 1356 ("'[T]he common law is reasonable usage,
throughout the whole realm, approved time out of mind in the king's courts of record which have jurisdiction
over the whole kingdom, to be good and profitable for the commonwealth."' (quoting Thomas Hedley, Speech
to Parliament in 1610, in J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 272-73 (2d ed.
1987))); accord id. at 1359.
129 See id. at 1362 ("[W]hen eighteenth-century lawyers spoke of 'reason,' they most often meant, not
craftsmanlike reason, nor revealed truth, but the activity of reasoning from first principles."); see also
POSTEMA, COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 124, at 37 (noting a "deep ambiguity in Common Law
theory, for it is not clear whether Common Law is regarded as itself defining standards of reason and justice in
this area of social life (Common Law regarded as reason), or whether Common Law is the working out of
reason (reason regarded as working in and through Common Law)").
130 See, e.g., Cromartie, supra note 75, at 86 ("Coke shared Sir John Doddridge's sense that common law
was natural law applied to English life.").
131 Id. at 83; Postema, Classical Common Law, supra note 55, at 178; see also STONER, LIBERAL THEORY,
supra note 70, at 177 ("The common law proceeds by reason, but by reason that collects and judges
particulars-by a sort of Aristotelian practical reason-rather than by reason in the modem, Enlightenment,
analytical sense-the reason that breaks apart and reassembles. It stresses continuity rather than novelty,
though it demands some reason greater than custom alone, for by common law, unreasonable customs have no
legal force.").
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phrase, "against common right and reason," to describe royal and
parliamentary actions that were void and unenforceable as violations of higher
law. 132  A decision or result "against common right and reason" (or, more
simply, "against reason") would violate both the legal order, in the sense that it
would be inconsistent with custom and precedent, 133 and the natural order, in
the sense that it would violate broader principles of natural justice and right. 134
II. DUE PROCESS AND UNENUMERATED RIGHTS BEFORE THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT
Coke was not alone in developing and using higher-law constitutionalism
during the seventeenth century.' 35  For example, both John Seldon and Sir
Matthew Hale, seventeenth-century common lawyers of great distinction,
acknowledged the influence of natural law on common law, 136 and defended
the position that judicial application of common law defined the limits of the
royal prerogative. 137  Nevertheless, American colonists looked almost
exclusively to Coke in formulating higher-law arguments against their
perceived oppression by Britain.
During the century following England's Glorious Revolution in 1688,
parliamentary supremacy replaced Coke's understanding that due process and
higher law checked royal and parliamentary encroachments on substantive
liberties. Higher-law constitutionalism, however, was received and adapted by
the American colonies in their revolutionary struggle with Britain.
Parliamentary supremacy slowly displaced higher-law constitutionalism during
the eighteenth century in Britain, but not in America, thereby framing the
132 See Edward S. Corwin, Natural Law and Constitutional Law, 3 U. NOTRE DAME NAT. L. INST. PROC.
45, 54 (1950) [hereinafter Corwin, Natural Law]; Pound, supra note 27, at 228.
133 See STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 25, 54 ("Coke appears to use reason to refer not to a
first principle but to a guarantor of consistency in the law as a whole .... ); Postema, Classical Common Law,
supra note 55, at 178 (noting that for "a custom, practice, rule or judgment to be 'against reason ... was for it
to be inconsistent with the law as a whole").
134 See Corwin, Natural Law, supra note 132, at 79; DOE, supra note 121, at 176 (finding that "there is a
resemblance between the practitioners' reason, upon which the common law was founded, and the theorists'
justice"; and observing that absurd results or arguments were considered "against reason"); STONER, LIBERAL
THEORY, supra note 70, at 58, 173 (observing that a violation of "common right and reason" was an absurd or
unjust result that, as such, did not bind the courts).
135 See Raffield, supra note 67, at 78.
136 See, e.g., Postema, Classical Common Law (pt. 2), supra note 123, at 27.
137 See STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 131-33 (contrasting Hale's idea of common law
reason with Hobbes's concept of an absolute sovereign); Raffield, supra note 67, at 78.
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constitutional conflict that led to the American Revolution and, ultimately, to
the American Constitution and Bill of Rights.
A. The English Constitutional Transition
Despite the best efforts of Coke and his contemporaries, Magna Carta, due
process, and common law courts did not prove adequate to cabin the absolutist
claims of the Stuarts. The efforts of Parliament, however, were another story.
During the 1640s, Parliament-more accurately, the Commons-fought,
deposed, and beheaded James's son and successor, Charles 1.138 After a decade
of theocratic despotism under "Lord Protector" Oliver Cromwell and his son
Richard, Parliament removed Richard in 1660 and restored the monarchy,
placing the son of the executed Charles on the throne as Charles 11.139 Nearly
three decades of fierce disagreement with Charles II and his successor, the
openly Catholic James II, ended in Parliament's orchestration of the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, in which James II was forced from the throne, and the
Dutch-Protestant William of Orange and his wife Mary, James II's daughter,
were installed as king and queen.
In the span of less than half a century, then, Parliament had successively
impeached, deposed, and executed one king, overthrown the Puritan
dictatorship that followed, reconstituted the monarchy, driven yet another king
into exile, and (finally) installed his successor. 14 1 That it was necessary for
Parliament to take these actions at all is perhaps the best evidence that higher-
law constitutionalism was not up to the task of reining in abuses of prerogative
by the Stuarts. What eventually arose in place of higher-law constitutionalism
was a different constitutional understanding, under which Parliament itself
wielded absolute constitutional authority as the sovereign in the British
constitutional system. Having vanquished the royal foes of English liberty,
Parliament formalized the protection of that liberty in itself. 142 As Professor
138 ADAMS, supra note 49, at 316-21.
139 Id. at 334-38; 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 13 (2d ed. 2002).
140 ADAMS, supra note 49, at 338-57.
141 Edmund S. Morgan, Constitutional History Before 1776, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 1, 7
(Leonard Levy et al. eds., 1989).
142 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 200 (enlarged ed.
1992) [hereinafter BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS] (noting that Parliament's actions were partially the result
of pressures from both Royalists and extreme libertarians, who promoted individual rights against all types of
government); 4 JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 55 (1987)
[hereinafter REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY] (comparing Parliament's exercise of authority to that of the
deposed kings).
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Reid has observed, the Glorious Revolution was "the triumph of liberty, but of
a liberty that had been institutionalized in Parliament's supremacy over the
crown." 143 The supremacy of Magna Carta, due process, and the common law,
in which Coke had placed so much faith, was replaced by the supremacy of
Parliament. 144
As the British seventeenth century gave way to the eighteenth, the authority
of Bonham's Case and the constitutional understanding that common law
judges might challenge royal and parliamentary power in defense of individual
liberty slowly receded. 145 By the mid-1700s, a competing understanding of the
English constitution had taken its place alongside higher-law
constitutionalism.146 This new understanding held the English constitution to
be what Parliament chose to enact or repeal as law, even when such actions
violated natural or common law. 147  Though this new constitution of
"sovereign command" would not clearly displace that of higher-law
constitutionalism until the nineteenth century, 148 already in 1765 Blackstone
could declare that there was no constitutional remedy for parliamentary
violation of the fundamental common law rights protected by the English
constitution. 149
143 4 REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 142, at 67; accord ARTHUR L. GOODHART, "LAW OF
THE LAND" 50 (1966) ("It was clear that there was no prerogative power vested in [the King] which was not
subject to ultimate control by Parliament."); Morgan, supra note 141, at 8.
144 See ORTH, supra note 72, at 25 ("The only institution that was a match for the Crown was Parliament,
as demonstrated ... in the Glorious Revolution of 1688.").
145 POWELL, supra note 123, at 81.
146 See 1 REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 142, at 76 ("The meaning of constitutionality was
drastically transformed."); 3 id. at 63-70; 4 id. at 55.
147 See POWELL, supra note 123, at 107 ("Blackstone, and English legal opinion of his day generally,
rejected any claim that judges could enforce this law of nature (or reason) in the teeth of positive law."); cf.
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 26-27 (2d ed. 1998)
(describing the eighteenth-century development of the Commons into "a kind of independent body distinct
from the people," and the "correlative conception of the sovereignty of Parliament, that is, that Parliament was
the final and supreme authority for all law even against the wishes of the people whom it supposedly
represented").
148 See Wayne McCormack, Lochner, Liberty, Property, and Human Rights, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
432, 446 (2005) [hereinafter McCormack, Lochner] ("Although the British courts eventually developed the
doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy, . . . Lords Coke and Holt viewed even Acts of Parliament as being
subject to the established rights of Englishmen.").
149 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91. Blackstone argued that acts of Parliament leading
to absurd results were void, but that the courts were without power to enforce this rule, even against
parliamentary violations of fundamental English rights. Id.; accord 2 id. at * 156-57 ("True it is, that what the
Parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo .... So long therefore as the English constitution lasts, we
may venture to affirm, that the power of parliament is absolute and without control.").
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B. Constitutional Ambiguity in the American Revolution
Because most of the American colonies were initially chartered and settled
during the early seventeenth century, when Coke's career as a judge and
member of Parliament was at its height, Coke exerted a strong influence on
colonial law.15 0  A large number of seventeenth-century American lawyers
studied law in England, where Coke's Reports and Institutes were a staple of
legal education,151 just as they were in the American colonies until the
publication of Blackstone's Commentaries in 1765.152 Even after Blackstone,
Coke's higher-law constitutionalism remained the more influential school of
thought before and during the Revolution, when the arguments of Locke and
the Whigs of the Glorious Revolution dominated legal and political thought in
the colonies.' 
53
Consequently, American lawyers were well-informed about English
constitutional principles, including Chapter 29 and the "myth of Magna Carta,"
Bonham's Case, and all the other resources of higher-law constitutionalism.
1 54
The influence of higher-law constitutionalism was evident in the colonies as
early as the mid-1650s. 55  When the revolutionary conflict arose in the
150 Barnes, supra note 71, at 24; Corwin, "Higher Law" Background (pt. 2), supra note 70, at 394; Grey,
Fundamental Law, supra note 29, at 850; Pound, supra note 27, at 229; Pound, supra note 122, at 349; Riggs,
supra note 29, at 945, 958-59.
1 See BOWEN, supra note 76, at 506-07 (noting how ubiquitous Coke's writings were in English legal
education); RODNEY L. MoTr, DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 31, at 87-88 (1973) (1926) (describing how Americans
who studied in London returned with a strong appreciation for Coke).
152 See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 142, at 30-31 ("In the later years of the Revolutionary
period, Blackstone's Commentaries and the opinions of Chief Justice Camden became standard authorities.");
BOWEN, supra note 76, at ix, 506-07 (noting that "Coke's Reports... went into many printings, abridgments,
[and] translations"); POWELL, supra note 123, at 81 (describing Blackstone's "remarkable publishing
success"); STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 4, 13 (noting that Blackstone, Locke, and Montesquieu
replaced Coke as the authority on the common law); Barnes, supra note 71, at 24-25 (describing how Coke
influenced some of the Founding Fathers); Meyler, supra note 67, at 34, 36 (comparing the underlying
constitutional theories of Coke, Hale, and Blackstone).
153 See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 142, at 30 (observing that colonial citations to Coke
were almost as frequent as those to Locke, Montesquieu, and Voltaire); Corwin, "Higher Law" Background
(pt. 2), supra note 70, at 376 (describing how Coke's theories continued to be influential in America after the
founding era); Pound, supra note 122, at 349 ("What the medieval cases and tradition were to Coke, Coke's
Second Institute and the decisions of the common-law courts he discusses or that followed him were to the
American lawyers before the Revolution.").
154 See ADAMS, supra note 49, at 333, 360-61; BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 142, at 45;
STRONG, supra note 52, at 14; WOOD, supra note 147, at 297.
155 E.g., Giddings v. Browne (Salem, Mass. County Ct., June 22 & Aug. 20, 1657) (voiding as a violation
of fundamental law a financial assessment voted by the majority of the town of Ipswich for the purpose of
providing a house for their pastor, because "laws positive do lose their force and are no laws at all, which are
directly contrary to the ... native or fundamental [law]," and "if no king or parliament can justly enact and
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mid-eighteenth century, the colonists bolstered their arguments against Britain
with the higher-law constitutionalism of the seventeenth century, not the
sovereign-command constitutionalism of the eighteenth century.
1 56
The Revolution took place against this backdrop of constitutional polarity
in Britain and the American colonies. 157 The higher-law constitutionalism of
Coke and seventeenth-century common lawyers was receding, while the
constitutionalism of parliamentary supremacy and sovereign command was
ascendant. 158  George III and the Tory majority in Parliament acted in
accordance with the new constitutional understanding, under which enactment
of a statute by Parliament was, by definition, consistent with the English
constitution. 159 They saw nothing constitutionally problematic in Parliament's
imposition of revenue-raising and internal regulatory measures on the colonies.
The colonists and the Whig minority, on the other hand, continued to
understand the colonies' relationship to the king and Parliament in terms of
seventeenth-century higher-law constitutionalism. 16 They accordingly reactedto parliamentary taxation and internal regulation of the colonies by invoking
cause that one man's estate, in whole or in part, may be taken from him and given to another without his own
consent, then surely the major part of a town or other inferior powers cannot do it,"), rev'd (Mass. Gen. Ct.
Oct. 14, 1657) (holding that the decision of the majority in such matters properly binds the whole), reported in
THOMAS J. HUTCHINSON, A COLLECTION OF ORIGINAL PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY OF
MASSACHUSEIrS-BAY 287-91, 308-09 (Boston, Thomas & John Fleet 1769) (spellings modernized); see
MOTT, supra note 151, § 33, at 93-95 (noting that nine provisions of Magna Carta were included in the
Massachusetts "Body of Liberties" drawn up in the 1630s in response to intrusive and trivial laws promulgated
by Governor Winthrop); POWELL, supra note 123, at 108 (observing that "late colonial American lawyers"
understood Coke in Bonham's Case "to have asserted a judicial power to disregard or invalidate unreasonable
and unconstitutional statutes"); Corwin, "Higher Law" Background (pt. 2), supra note 70, at 394-95 (noting
that during the seventeenth century, Magna Carta became closely identified in the colonies with "all
documents of constitutional significance, and thereby a symbol and reminder of principles binding on
government," and that Coke's dictum in Bonham's Case was occasionally cited outside New England, "even
before its notable revival by Otis").
156 See, e.g., PLUCKNETT, supra note 67, at 40-41 ("It was mediaevalists in England, armed with Bracton
and the Year Books, who ended Stuart statecraft, and the Constitution of the United States was written by men
who had Magna Carta and Coke upon Littleton before their eyes."); POWELL, supra note 123, at 82 (arguing
that the "subversion of the classical common law in England was substantially ignored in America"); Corwin,
"Higher Law" Background (pt. 2), supra note 70, at 367 (suggesting that few judicial pronouncements are
more important to the origins of American constitutional theory than Coke's dictum in Bonham's Case).
157 4 REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 142, at 4, 56.
158 See id. at 4-5; Grey, Fundamental Law, supra note 29, at 866-67 ("According to the new theory,
England's constitution was no more than the set of laws, institutions and traditional principles for governing
the nation and was legally subject to alteration by Parliament at any time."); Meyler, supra note 67, at 12.
159 See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 142, at 30-31, 47; JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 211 (1996); WOOD, supra note 147, at
13-15; supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
160 See supra Part II.A.
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Magna Carta, due process, and fundamental common law rights.
16 1
Ultimately, of course, this conflict was resolved by revolution and
independence.
In resisting parliamentary control during the pre-revolutionary period, the
colonists relied heavily on the arguments of higher-law constitutionalism from
seventeenth-century England, including Magna Carta and Coke's dictum in
Bonham's Case. 6  Paxton's Case, for example, involved a royal customs
officer who sought a "writ of assistance," or general search warrant, to give
him unbounded authority to search the home of any colonist for smuggled
goods. 163 Opposing the writ, colonial lawyer James Otis appealed directly to
higher-law constitutionalism, citing Bonham's Case: "As to Acts of
Parliament, an Act against the Constitution is void; an Act against natural
Equity is void; and if an Act of Parliament should be made, in the very Words
of this Petition, it would be void."'164 Citing Magna Carta and Coke's Second
Institute, Otis concluded that Parliament was not "the final arbiter of the justice
and constitutionality of its own acts"; rather, "the validity of statutes must be
judged by the Courts of Justice,"' 165 thereby foreshadowing, in the words of
reporter John Adams, the basic principle of American constitutionalism, "that
it is the duty of the judiciary to declare unconstitutional statutes void."' 166
161 2 REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 142, at 14, 138; Grey, Fundamental Law, supra note
29, at 879-80, 887.
162 See MoW, supra note 151, § 49, at 127 ("T]he fundamental character of the constitution of the British
Empire was quite generally recognized as being unalterable by simple parliamentary flat."); RAKOVE, supra
note 159, at 212, 245; JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN LIBERTY 65 (2005) [hereinafter REID, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION] (describing the way in which the
Founding Fathers viewed legal history); see also JOHN C. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
169 (1943) (observing that "natural law and the rights of Englishmen" constituted sources of constitutional
argument deployed by the colonists against Britain).
163 See Paxton's Case of the Writ of Assistance (Mass. Bay Super. Prov. Ct. 1761), reported in I JOSIAH
QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE
PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 51-57, app. I-A, at 395-405 (Boston, Little,
Brown, & Co. 1865) [hereinafter Paxton's Case]. For a description of the case and its origins in the abusive
issuance of writs of assistance, see MILLER, supra note 162, at 46-47.
164 Paxton's Case, supra note 163, app. I-D, at 471, 474 & n.20 (report of John Adams) (citing Viner
("Reason of ye Com. Law to control an Act of Parliament"); Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646,
651 (K.B.), reprinted in I THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE 265 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003)); see
id. app. I-I, at 521-24 (listing Otis's quotations from Coke on Magna Carta).
165 Id. app. I-I, at 520-21; see id. app. I-I, at 521 n.23 (citing Bonham's Case); id. app. I-E, at 483-85
(listing Otis's quotations from Coke on Magna Carta). Otis's citation to the Second Institute references the
section in which Coke explicates Chapter 29 line-by-line. See SECOND INSTITUTE, supra note 110, at 848-73.
166 Paxton's Case, supra note 163, app. I-I, at 521.
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Although the court in Paxton's Case ultimately granted the writ, Otis's
higher-law argument that courts may invalidate parliamentary acts against
Magna Carta and common law rights quickly became a staple of colonial
constitutional argument. 167  Otis's contemporaries immediately grasped the
rhetorical power of subjecting governmental institutions and positive laws to
"fundamentals" and "principles," as Otis seemed to have done in arguing
against British governance of the colonies. 168 Indeed, the colonists understood
Otis to have gone far beyond Coke by arguing that an ordinary court could
overturn the specifically enacted will of Parliament, 169 and they accordingly
treated Bonham's Case as a virtual rule permitting courts to void any act of
Parliament against natural justice or the common law. 17  After Otis published
his argument in pamphlet form, 171  a number of prominent colonial
revolutionaries relied on it as the basis for their own constitutional arguments
against parliamentary actions. 172  Although some of these arguments
emphasized the writtenness of a constitution, they also emphasized that even a
written constitution did not create or eclipse fundamental rights, but merely
declared and guaranteed them. 173  Although the colonists did not always cite
167 SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 94, at 57-58; Corwin, "Higher Law" Background (pt. 2),
supra note 70, at 398-99; Riggs, supra note 29, at 971.
168 Pound, supra note 122, at 368; Riggs, supra note 29, at 970; e.g., James Wilson, Considerations on the
Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament (1774), in I COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 3, 3-4 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
169 Corwin, "Higher Law" Background (pt. 2), supra note 70, at 398; see also SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT
RIGHTS, supra note 94, at 56 ("During the conflict that led to the Revolution, Americans increasingly took the
dictum in Dr. Bonham's Case literally, as a statement that there was a fundamental law limiting Parliamentary
powers. Had not my Lord Coke concluded, they argued among themselves, that when an Act of Parliament is
contrary to such fundamental law, it must be adjudged void? Did this not mean that when the British
government acts toward the colonies in a manner contrary to common right and reason, its decrees too must be
given no legal force?").
170 See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke's
British Jurisprudence, 21 L. & HIST. REV. 439, 440 (2003).
171 JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (Boston, Edes & Gill
1764).
172 See, e.g., ANTIEAU, supra note 29, at 351 (Samuel Adams); BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra
note 142, at 181-82 (Samuel Adams); id. at 182-83 (Samuel Cook); Corwin, "Higher Law" Background,
supra note 57, at 169 (John Adams); Corwin, "Higher Law" Background (pt. 2), supra note 70, at 400
(Massachusetts Circular Letter of 1768); Riggs, supra note 29, at 970 (John Adams's petition against the
Stamp Act); id. at 970-71 (Benjamin Franklin); id. at 971 (Daniel Dulany); see also BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS, supra note 142, at 184 (defining a constitution as a "'set offundamental rules by which even the
supreme power of the state shall be governed' and which the legislature is absolutely forbidden to alter"
(quoting and paraphrasing a revolutionary pamphlet)).
173 See, e.g., BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 142, at 183 ("[AIIl the great rights which man
never mean, nor ever ought, to lose should be guaranteed, not granted, by the constitution .... " (quoting
ANONYMOUS, FOUR LETTERS ON INTERESTING SUBJECTS 22 (Philadelphia 1776))).
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Chapter 29, in most cases they relied on the concept of higher-law
constitutionalism embedded in the seventeenth-century concept of due process
of law. 174 With Coke, 175 the colonists understood Chapter 29 and due process
as general protections against arbitrary and oppressive government,17 6 which
left only a short step to understanding the common law "as a limitation upon
the impairment of vested rights or the tyrannical exercise of the police power"
by Parliament. 1
77
The extent to which the colonists incorporated higher-law constitutionalism
into their constitutional thinking in the years following Paxton's Case is
evident in Robin v. Hardaway, a 1772 decision reported by Thomas
Jefferson. 178  George Mason, who would later participate in the Philadelphia
convention (but refuse to endorse its constitutional product), represented
Native American plaintiffs challenging a Virginia colonial statute providing
that descendants of Native American women were slaves. 179 Citing Bonham's
Case, Mason argued as a general constitutional rule that "all acts of legislature
apparently contrary to natural right and justice, are, in our laws, and must be in
the nature of things, considered as void."' 180  Mason also drew an analogy that
showed how higher-law constitutionalism had become central to colonial
thought in the decade since Paxton's Case, arguing that natural law had the
same normative force with respect to the statute in question in Robin as the
174 See, e.g., MOTT, supra note 151, § 50, at 132 (arguing that general citations to Magna Carta during the
revolutionary era probably referred to the concept of due process, because of the ubiquitousness of quotations
from Chapter 29 in the revolutionary protest literature); Corwin, Natural Law, supra note 132, at 55-56
(summarizing arguments against writs of assistance, the Stamp Act, and other parliamentary acts).
175 See supra Part I.B.I.
176 See, e.g., REID, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 162, at 84 ("The jurisprudence of Magna Carta in
the eighteenth century, therefore, was a rejection of the constitutionalism of arbitrary power."); see also Morr,
supra note 151, § 54, at 142 (observing that for the American colonists, "[d]ue process of law" resembled "a
catch-all phrase for human rights rather than a phrase with a well defined content").
Professor Reid argues that late eighteenth-century English Whigs had a comparable understanding of
Magna Carta as "a virtual constitution of individual rights," an organic law whose general function was "to
enhance individual liberty and restrain governmental discretion." REID, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note
162, at 82, 83.
177 See MOTT, supra note 151, § 47, at 123; see also LEVY, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that American views
on law, religion, and political theory were informed by "a highly selective and romanticized image of
seventeenth-century England, and they perpetuated it in America even as that England changed"); THORNE,
supra note 95, at 237 (suggesting that England and the United States alike "are indebted to [Coke] for an
unhistorical but profoundly influential commentary on Magna Carta, and for much fundamental constitutional
law not completely supported by the sources").
178 1 Va. (Jeff.) 109 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1772).
179 id.
180 Id. at 114 (citing Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.); Calvin's Case, (1608) 77 Eng.
Rep. 377 (K.B.)).
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colonies claimed for it in arguing against oppressive acts of Parliament.1 8' The
court did not reach this issue, however, finding that the challenged act had
already been repealed.1
82
By the early 1770s, therefore, the meaning attributed to Chapter 29 had
merged with the broader concept of higher-law constitutionalism, which held
king and Parliament alike to limitations prescribed by the natural and
customary rights recognized at common law. By then, the colonists had also
adopted the seventeenth-century tenet that English common law liberties
reflected and reinforced natural law and natural rights, thereby importing this
confused relationship into American law.183  The colonists multiplied the
confusion by largely abandoning the purportedly ancient Saxon origin of the
common law as the source of its authority, in favor of the common law's
purported implementation of natural law and natural rights, 184 even though that
181 id.
182 Id. at 123.
183 See, e.g., Meyler, supra note 67, at 18 (arguing that "the common law occupied a disunified field" in
late eighteenth-century America and that its "very definition and scope," including "its relation to the 'ancient
constitution' securing the rights of the people," was the subject of serious dispute among the founding
generation); Whitman, supra note 128, at 1324-25 (observing that "[llegal thought among the American
revolutionary lawyers presented a picture of apparent intellectual chaos, drawn from a variegated mass of
traditions"; and further noting that the "apparent disorder was worst in the many writings that commingled talk
of 'natural law' or the 'law of reason' with talk of the English constitution and customary law"); id. at 1365
(observing that the colonists were well-read in Pufendorf, Coke, Hale, Blackstone, and other "seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century literature that embodied the mix of custom and reason," which resulted in the colonists
applying "the deductive idea of reason they learned from their eighteenth-century readings . . . within the
mingling tradition of the seventeenth century"); see also MILLER, supra note 162, at 171 ("Americans
continued to insist that the British constitution was founded upon natural laws and that God and Nature had
ordained that there were certain things-clear to every man-which King and Parliament could not do.").
184 See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 142, at 184-86 (describing the exchange between
Judge Martin Howard, Jr. and James Otis, in which they questioned what would happen if government
"threatened rather than protected" the inalienable rights of man); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 7-9 (1992) (discussing statements by
eighteenth-century American judges and lawyers, including John Adams and James Kent, that the common
law constituted a fixed body of discoverable rules precisely because it was grounded in natural reason); WOOD,
supra note 147, at 299 (noting that the "haphazard and piecemeal introduction of the common law into the
colonies" contributed to the idea that the law's authority came not just from "its being old or being English");
see also BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 142, at 78 ("The great corpus of common law decisions
and the pronouncements of King and Commons were but expression of 'God and nature .... The natural
absolute personal rights of individuals are ... the very basis of all municipal laws of any great value."'
(quoting John Dickinson)); CARL L. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 98-99 (1958)
(summarizing and quoting Samuel Adams's belief that all legislation is subordinate to the English constitution,
"an authority higher than any positive law," because it is "'fixed,' having its foundation in 'the law of God and
nature"'); STONER. LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 194-95 (arguing that Jefferson believed that common
law and natural law "actually do tell similar stories: Both look back to a past where the power of hcreditary
authority is limited, in the one case by settled custom and the other by popular consent, and both insist of law
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identification had been only implicitly and sporadically present in the
seventeenth century. 185  Like the English in the seventeenth century, the
Americans never worked out the identification of natural law with common
law. The colonists adopted the common law, not because it was customary,
but because they believed that it reflected "'the highest Reason."" 86  This
belief led them to an improbable attempt to synthesize liberal political
principles with common law adjudication.' 8
The colonists were somewhat clearer on the consequences of higher-law
constitutionalism than were the seventeenth-century common law lawyers and
judges. "Law" for the colonists, Professor Wood concluded, "was basically
what the principles of right reason declared to be law, the codification of which
was hardly inclusive," even when such codifications were rooted in the
common law. 188 Though they believed that common law incorporated natural
rights, they also believed that in case of tensions and conflicts, it was law that
must give way to right.
189
and constitution that they meet the test of reason"); Whitman, supra note 128, at 1326 & n.18 (observing that
the Massachusetts Circular Letter of 1768 identified "the fundamental rules of the British constitution' with
'an essential, unalterable right, in nature,"' and that Richard Bland and Alexander Hamilton held comparable
beliefs).
185 See supra Part I.B.2.
186 See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 147, at 9 (quoting Roger Sherman); accord Page v. Pendleton (Va. High
Ch. Ct. 1793), reported in GEORGE WYTHE, DECISIONS OF CASES IN VIRGINIA BY THE HIGH COURT OF
CHANCERY 211, 215 n.(e) (B.B. Minor ed., J.W. Randolph 1852) (equating the "law of nature" with the
"unwritten or common law," and arguing that positive law is valid only to the extent that it conforms with
"natural reason"); CRAIG EVAN KLAFTER, REASON OVER PRECEDENTS: ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 40 (1993) (noting St. George Tucker's project of demonstrating that "reason should be the ultimate
test in determining the soundness of the law and its application"); Whitman, supra note 128, at 1365 (arguing
that the colonial impulse to ground the common law in the natural law "informed Otis's frantic efforts to
reconcile common law and natural law").
187 See POWELL, supra note 123, at 79 ("The equation of the common law tradition with 'the rights of
Englishmen,' and of the latter with Enlightenment concepts of individual autonomy and the rule of law,
enabled many Americans ... to make the theoretically improbable assumption that liberal political principles
could be explicated in the forms of the common law."); Whitman, supra note 128, at 1326 (noting that
revolutionary writers "often speak of 'reason' as a body of 'fixed principles,' of 'immutable maxims of reason
and justice' to be discovered through deductive thought, not through lived experience").
188 WOOD, supra note 147, at 295; cf Haines, supra note 8, at 276 (noting several opinions of common
law lawyers and judges).
189 WOOD, supra note 147, at 9, 299; Haines, supra note 8, at 24-25, 276; e.g., WOOD, supra note 147, at
303 ("'When there is a contrariety between law and reason .... the judges must be embarrassed."' (quoting
Anonymous, Rudiments of Law and Government Deduced from the Law of Nature 35 (1783), reprinted in I
CHARLES S. HYNEMAN & DONALD S. LuTz, AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA
1760-1805, at 588 (1983))).
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"Magna Carta" eventually became a shorthand referent for natural and
customary rights, which the colonists understood to be guaranteed to them by
the English constitution. 190 Citing "Magna Carta" was understood, not (or not
merely) as an invocation of Chapter 29 or any other particular chapter, but as a
general appeal to all of the seventeenth-century terms and arguments used to
identify unconstitutional acts.
In sum, by the time the colonies declared their independence in 1776, due
process and Magna Carta had become an integral part of the colonial argument
against parliamentary taxes and regulation of the colonial police power. As
Dean Manion observed, pre-revolutionary colonial courts "were constantly
hearing arguments and deciding cases on the natural rights theory projected by
Coke as a basic principle of the common law."'191 The colonists' central
constitutional claim was that they, no less than other English subjects, were
entitled to all of the unwritten natural and customary rights that had been
recognized at English common law and granted to English subjects. Adopting
Coke's higher-law constitutionalism, the colonists argued that Chapter 29 and
the due process of law protected them from arbitrary and unjust actions by
Parliament as well as the king. The colonists also adopted (and exaggerated)
Coke's view that Chapter 29 was not confined to a guarantee of procedural
fairness but also limited the substantive goals that the king and Parliament
could pursue.
190 E.g., REID, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 162, at 84; see MOrT, supra note 151, § 27, at 74-75
("Some scholars see in chapter thirty-nine of the Great Charter from the very first the protection of general
justice and right."); Hill, supra note 29, at 1271-72 (referring to "law-of-the-land" clauses in state
constitutions, which were derived from the Magna Carta and "understood to be the equivalent of the due
process clause"); Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of Livelihood, 82 KY.
L.J. 397, 401 (1993-94) [hereinafter McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process] (referring to the
"variety of nascent, unenumerated rights" included in the concept of the "law of the land" clause of Magna
Carta).
191 Clarence E. Manion, The Natural Law Philosophy of Founding Fathers, 1 U. NOTRE DAME NAT. L.
INST. PROC. 3, 25 (1949); accord Haines, supra note 8, at 397 (concluding that the colonists identified "due
process of law" with "the natural and inalienable rights' philosophy which was developed in the Revolutionary
times and was crystallized into specific form in the Declaration of Independence and in the bills of rights of
state constitutions," and that the "law of the land" was understood "to mean that no power was delegated to the
legislature to invade the great natural rights of the individual, and that where express limits were lacking
implied checks must be found").
As Dean Manion's and Professor Haines's quotations illustrate, the natural law approach to
constitutional interpretation was thought to be quite congenial to founding-era constitutionalism and
conservative principles generally before the Reagan Administration's adoption of originalism in the late
twentieth century.
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C. Due Process and Unenumerated Rights in the Post-Revolutionary States
Colonial independence in 1776 necessitated two adjustments in American
constitutional thought: a more explicit natural rights formulation of the
constitutional basis for unenumerated rights and a reconstitution of the state
governments into republics from colonial administrations subject to British
monarchical rule. Both of these developments support the thesis that higher-
law constitutionalism continued beyond independence, as reflected in the
states' continued amalgamation of natural and customary rights, their
constitutional distinction of "forms," "frames," and "plans" of governments
from "declarations" and "guarantees" of rights, and the manner in which state
courts dealt with such "declarations" and "guarantees" in decisions that
implicated natural or customary rights.
1. Higher-Law Constitutionalism and Natural and Customary Rights
The English constitution provided an incomplete justification of the
American Revolution because revolt necessarily entailed withdrawal from that
constitutional system.' 92 Thus, the Declaration of Independence begins with
the natural rights theory drawn from Locke's Second Treatise, rather than
arguments of higher-law constitutionalism drawn from the English common
law. 193 Nevertheless, the colonial belief that the common law captured and
reflected natural rights and the natural law, imported from the English
seventeenth century, 194 enabled them to combine the Declaration's appeal to
natural rights with arguments about customary rights based on the common
law.' 95 The confused amalgamation of natural right and common law that
characterized both seventeenth-century and pre-revolutionary constitutional
jurisprudence was thereby carried into independence.'96
The Declaration follows its natural law introduction with a long list of
common law rights and liberties which George III was alleged to have either
192 STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 186; Grey, Fundamental Law, supra note 29, at 890.
193 See BECKER, supra note 184, at 20-21 (noting that the separation from Great Britain was justified on
the ground of natural fights rather than British law); Corwin, "'Higher Law" Background (pt. 2), supra note 70,
at 383 (referring to the conveyance of Locke's "natural law ideas into American constitutional theory").
194 See supra Part I.B.2.
195 See RAKOVE, supra note 159, at 293; 1 REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 142, at 5;
STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 186.
196 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 159, at 293 (noting the "tension in the Declaration of Independence
between the preambular invocation of natural rights and the legalist appeal to specific English rights in the
body of the text").
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violated, neglected, or failed to secure against parliamentary encroachment. 1
97
The Declaration even accused the King of conspiring with Parliament to
subject the colonies "to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution and
unacknowledged by our laws,"' 198 employing the term "constitution" in the
same manner as the English Whigs did to refer to fundamental laws that
limited government, 199 and echoing Otis's and Mason's respective higher-law
constitutional arguments in Paxton's Case and Robin v. Hardaway.
200
The Declaration's basic argument-that Britain's violation of natural and
customary rights justified revolution-fit neatly with the seventeenth-century
notion that the "law of the land" and the "due process of law" limited the
actions of the crown and Parliament. 20 1  In the eyes of the colonists, it was
197 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). According to the Declaration, the "history of the
present king of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations," including indefinite dissolution
of colonial legislatures, veto of laws providing for an independent colonial judiciary, maintenance of standing
armies in the colonies during times of peace, quartering of troops in the colonists' homes, embargoing colonial
trade, imposition of taxes without colonial consent or representation in Parliament, and depriving colonists of
trial by jury and at the venue. Id.; see REID, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 162, at 110 (referring to the
"listing of constitutional grievances" in the Declaration); I REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 142,
at 92 (noting that the rights listed in the Declaration derived from British constitutional theory or English
common law); STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 187 (describing the objections listed in the
Declaration); Sherry, supra note 29, at 1127, 1133 (referring to the rights declared in the English Bill of
Rights, the Declaration of Independence, and state declarations of rights).
198 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added); accord JAMES WILSON,
AN ADDRESS TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE COLONIES (1776), reprinted in I COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON, supra note 168, at 46, 58 (arguing that the "Grand Object of the Union of the Colonies" was "the
Reestablishment and Security of their constitutional Rights").
199 See STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 188. The term "constitution" in the Declaration
"could not have meant.., anything so narrow as the particular colonial charters," but rather
must be taken to mean, as the term then meant when used in reference to the British, the whole
amalgam of offices, principles, and fundamental laws that give the polity its form .... What the
whole sentence suggests is that independence, though necessarily a step beyond the existing
constitution and thus necessarily based on the most fundamental political principles, still
proceeds down a well-trod path.
Id. at 188-89.
200 See supra notes 164-66, 179-81, and accompanying text.
201 See, e.g., MOTr, supra note 151, §30, at 84-85 ("Locke's suggestion that the power of the Legislature
should not extend to the issuance of extemporary decrees, special or partial laws, or laws which are against the
'law of Nature,' is very closely akin to the modem concept, if not to the original meaning, of due process of
law."); see also STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 189 (arguing that the "specifics of the common
law and the ancient constitution" gave Locke's natural rights theory "its distinctive form," while that theory
ordered the particulars of the common law).
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precisely the failure of Britain to respect these limits that justified their
withdrawal from the empire.
202
2. Constituting Post-Revolutionary State Governments
Upon their formal separation from Britain, the newly independent states
needed to constitute their governments as sovereign entities without the royal
appointments that had formed a crucial part of the colonial governments, and
without relying on the royalty and nobility that characterized the British
constitutional monarchy. 203  The states generally adapted the British
constitutional monarchy to republican government by providing for a popularly
elected bicameral legislature, and an emasculated executive stripped of most
204prerogative powers and largely subordinated to the legislature. Most states
also provided for a separate judiciary, although it is doubtful that this signified
genuine independence for the courts. 205  In any event, there was little doubt
that the state legislatures were the most important and most powerful part of
the new governments.20 6
That revolutionary Americans carried higher-law constitutionalism into
independence, as I have argued, 207 is reflected in their post-independence
202 See MILLER, supra note 162, at 8 (referring to British restraints on colonial trade); McCormack,
Lochner, supra note 148, at 446-47 (referring to the "limitation on government" suggested in the Declaration
of Independence).
203 See, e.g., BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 142, at 71 (referring to the organization of
English government around royalty, nobility, and commons, and noting that "the balance of the [American]
constitution was not expected to be the result of the symmetrical matching of social orders with powers of
government"); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 100 (1973) (noting that since the
"old ties with England had been snapped," the states "put their basic political decisions in the form of written
constitutions"); RAKOVE, supra note 159, at 21, 306 (referring to the "collapse of royal government," which
provided the colonists with the opportunity to "establish new and superior forms of government"); WOOD,
supra note 147, at 157 (noting that the colonists' experiences caused them to "repudiate, more decisively than
Englishmen ever had the means by which" royalty and nobility oppressed the liberties of the people).
204 See RAKOVE, supra note 159, at 214 ("By stripping the executive of its political independence and
prerogatives, the new state constitutions gave the assemblies the same supremacy Parliament had enjoyed
since 1689."); WOOD, supra note 147, at 135-51, 163 (describing the approaches of various states in
establishing new governmental entities); infra app. (describing the attributes of various state constitutions at
the time of the American Revolution).
205 See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 142, at 71 (observing that the colonists did not see a
clear separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government); WOOD,
supra note 147, at 153-54, 157-61 (noting that the courts were alternately conceptualized as a division of the
executive department or an extension of the legislature); Haines, supra note 8, at 391 (describing the extensive
supervision and control exercised by legislatures over the state courts).
206 WOOD, supra note 147, at 162-63.
207 See supra Part lI.B.
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constitutions. A state "constitution" generally consisted of a written plan or
frame of government that was positively enacted or affirmed by the state
legislature, together with natural and customary rights whose existence
predated any constitutional text, and that may not have been reduced to any
writing at all.208  Like the British version, American higher-law
constitutionalism presupposed that natural and customary rights are prior to
any frame of government or, indeed, to any writing at all.209  As Professor
Sherry has argued, following independence, "the written [state] constitution or
charter served as the sole source of fundamental law for determining the [state]
government's internal structure, but not for describing its relationship to the
citizenry. ' 21°  Because natural and customary rights were believed to exist
independently of any writing, it was not necessary to enumerate them textually
or to otherwise enact them into positive law for them to function as limits on
the actions of the newly framed state governments. 211 Textual enumeration did
make clear that these rights and liberties were understood to be a natural
birthright rather than a royal or parliamentary concession, 212 and that they were
enforceable against legislative as well as executive action, 213 but a textual
enumeration was not understood to have created the rights it listed.
The distinction between frames of government enacted as positive law, and
natural and customary rights existing independent of positive law, is evident in
208 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 203, at 103 (referring to the two functions of a constitution-providing a
"terse exposition of the permanent shape of the government" and listing essential rights); Sherry, supra note
29, at 1146 (referring to a constitution as a "declaration of first principles" and "a charter of government or
allocation of powers among parts of the government"); see also MCILWAIN, supra note 54, at 244 (implying
that some revolutionary state constitutions formally distinguished a "bill of rights" from a "frame of
government").
209 Sherry, supra note 29, at 1133; see supra text accompanying notes 178-206.
210 Sherry, supra note 29, at 1135; accord McCormack, Lochner, supra note 148, at 446-47 ("[T]he idea
of 'inalienable rights' places limits on the claims that government can make on an individual, and posits that
those claims are not dependent on human laws and constitutions but belong naturally to all persons."); see also
WOOD, supra note 147, at 286-87 (observing that the understanding that identified the state "constitutions"
more closely with positively enacted forms of government was abandoned during the 1780s, in favor of an
understanding of such constitutions as limitations on the powers of the government it created, which
correspondingly protected individual rights).
211 See Sherry, supra note 29, at 1146 (referring to the "non-positive" nature of constitutions); see also
BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 142, at 188 ("Legal rights are 'those rights which we are entitled
to by the eternal laws of right reason'; they exist independent of positive law, and stand as the measure of its
legitimacy." (quoting Philip Livingston)). But see RAKOVE, supra note 159, at 309 (suggesting that the state
bills of rights functioned less as enforceable constitutional law than as statements of first principles, which
provided standards according to which the people could judge the performance of their elected officials).
212 See BAILYN. IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 142, at 184-88 (suggesting that the enumerated rights
existed before they were enacted).
213 WOOD, supra note 147, at 272.
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the language used in the written constitutions enacted by the states following
independence. Whereas these constitutions created the frames of state
government, they merely declared or guaranteed natural and customary
rights.214 For example, five of the original thirteen states, plus Vermont, 215
enacted extensive textual enumerations of natural and customary rights, which
they called declarations or bills of such rights, and which they formally
separated from the texts that framed the new state governments. 216  Virginia
and North Carolina even placed their frames of government and declarations of
rights in wholly different texts that their legislatures enacted at different
times.217  The distinction between frames of government and declarations of
218rights was also evident in the ratification debates. The remaining original
214 E.g., MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. I ("A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts"), reprinted in I BENJAMIN PERLEY POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 956, 957
(Washington, Gov't Printing Office, 2d ed. 1878); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1776, at 1908 ("A declaration of
rights .... "), reprinted in 2 POORE, supra, at 1908; see WOOD, supra note 147, at 269, 271 (referring to
"ringing declarations of universal principles"); see also BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 142, at 189
("No voice was raised in objection when in 1776 the idea was proclaimed, and acted upon, that 'all the great
rights . . . should be guaranteed' by the terms of a written constitution." (alteration in original) (citations
omitted)).
In 2008, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized that the Second Amendment did not create, but
merely codified, the pre-existing natural right of self-defense. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,
2804, 2809, 2812-13 (2008).
215 Vermont was not formally admitted as a state until 1790, after Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
New York formally renounced their respective claims to its territory. It had, however, organized its own
government and had functioned as a separate, independent colony since the early 1770s, and consequently
adopted its own constitution in the wake of the others' declarations of independence in 1776. See 2 POORE,
supra note 214, at 1857 nn.* & f; WOOD, supra note 147, at 133; Samuel B. Hand, History, in THE VERMONT
ENCYCLOPEDIA 8, 8-10 (John J. Duffy, Samuel B. Hand, & Ralph H. Orth eds., 2003).
216 See infra app. (Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia). New
Hampshire enacted a constitution on this pattern in 1784, Delaware in 1792, and Kentucky upon its admission
as a state in 1792. id.
217 For Virginia, compare VA. BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1776, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 214, at 1908,
with VA. CONST OF 1776, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 214, at 1910. Both documents were enacted by the
same constitutional convention. See id. at 1910 n.*. For North Carolina, see N.C. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted
in 2 POORE, supra note 214, at 1409, 1411 (separating "A Declaration of Rights, &c." from "The Constitution,
or Form of Government, &c."); JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 2-3 (1993) (noting that the "declaration of rights" was enacted December 17, 1776, while the
"constitution" was enacted December 18, 1776).
218 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 19 1) (arguing
that judicial independence is necessary "to guard the constitution and the rights of individuals"); id. at 528
(arguing that judicial independence is essential not only "with a view to infractions of the constitution," but
also to protect against "injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws");
id. at 529 (endorsing "inflexible and uniform adherence to rights of the constitution and of individuals"); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra, at 575 (noting that the "constitution of New-York
has no bill of rights prefixed to it").
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states, with one exception,2 19 interwove enumerations of a few natural and
customary rights into the texts that framed their forms of government.
220
Finally, eight of the original thirteen states, plus Vermont, enacted "law of the
land" clauses-paraphrases of Chapter 29, which generally declared or
guaranteed that citizens could not be deprived of life, liberty, property, or
privilege, except by the "lawful judgment of their peers or the law of the
land."
221
3. Higher-Law Constitutionalism in Post-Revolutionary Judicial Decisions
The historical record of judicial decisions and arguments of counsel
following the Revolution is mixed, although the weight of this authority
supports the proposition that the colonists carried higher-law constitutionalism
with them into independence. Several cases involved clear arguments or
holdings based on higher-law constitutionalism. Rutgers v. Waddington, for
example, involved a claim under New York's general trespass statute by a
homeowner whose property was used by a British merchant during the
222occupation of New York City during the Revolutionary War. The court held
that the law of nations-long considered a branch of natural law
reasoning23 -properly determined the outcome, reasoning that the law of
nations was part of the common law and, therefore, necessarily limited the
224
reach of the statute. The court accordingly decided that the merchant was
not liable under the statute for any use of the property.225
In Trevett v. Weeden, the court held that a Rhode Island criminal statute
prescribing banknotes as legal tender and mandating bench trials for those
219 Rhode Island neither enacted a new state constitution nor affirmed its colonial charter as such. See
infra app.; see also Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 656 (1829); WOOD, supra note 147, at 133-34.
220 See infra app. (Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and South
Carolina). New Hampshire enacted a frame of government and a declaration of rights in 1784, and Delaware
followed suit in 1792. Id.
221 See infra app. (Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia).
222 Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in I THE LAW PRACTICE OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 392 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1964) [hereinafter Rutgers v. Waddington].
223 See, e.g., M.D. VATIEL [EMER DE VATTEL[, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS §§ 4-6, at 47-48
(Northampton, Mass., Simeon Butler, 1820) (1758) (unattributed English translation of VATTEL, LE DROrr DES
GENS) ("We must then apply to nations the rules of the law of nature, in order to discover what are their
obligations, and what are their laws; consequently, the law of nations is originally no more than the law of
nature applied to nations.").
224 Rutgers v. Waddington, supra note 222, at 399, 402-06.
225 Id. at 399-415.
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accused of refusing to accept the banknotes was "void" for violation of the
"constitutional" right to trial by jury. 226 Although Rhode Island had no written
post-independence constitution or declaration of rights, the court accepted
counsel's argument that the state's "constitution" included Magna Carta and
227other natural and customary English rights.. Counsel also attacked the
statute on substantive grounds, arguing that its requirement that banknotes be
accepted at par with gold and silver specie was an "abominable act" against
"common right or reason," though the court did not reach this issue.22 8
In Butler v. Craig,229 a Maryland court refused to enforce a statute which
provided that the offspring of illegal marriages between free whites and
enslaved blacks were themselves slaves, apparently accepting counsel's
argument that depriving the defendant of her freedom without a jury trial,
based solely on the conviction of her parents for an unlawful marriage, violated
the law of the land or due process guarantees set forth in Chapter 29 of Magna
Carta.230 Although the Maryland Declaration of Rights contained both law-of-
the-land and jury-trial guarantees, 231 counsel did not discuss or cite them,
relying solely on Coke's Second Institute, Edwardian confirmations of Chapter
29, and other English common law authorities. 232
The strongest judicial statement of higher-law constitutionalism prior to
1791 appears in Ham v. McClaws.2 3 3  In Ham, a South Carolina court
considered the state's attempt to impose a statutory fine and forfeiture against a
newly arrived family in the state for illegal importation of slaves, 234 based on a
statute enacted while defendants were in transit on the high seas.235  South
Carolina's Declaration of Rights contained a law-of-the-land clause, but
defendants' counsel and the court relied solely on the arguments and sources of
higher-law constitutionalism. 236  Conceding that defendants fell within the
226 See Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. 1786), private report reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 417 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) (argument of James Varnum).
227 Id. at 417, 420-21,423 (letters modernized).
221 Id. at 425-26.
229 2 H. & McH. 214 (Md. 1787).
230 Id. at 232-33 (citation omitted).
231 See infra app.
232 Id. at 233-34 (citation omitted).
233 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 91 (S.C. Ct. Com. P1. 1789).
234 Id.
235 Id. at 92. Testimony existed that revealed that, prior to immigrating, the defendants had actually
inquired whether they could bring their slaves with them, and had correctly ascertained that the then-current
law of South Carolina permitted the act. Id. at 91.
236 Id. at 92-95.
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strict letter of the statute, counsel argued that its application to defendants
would nevertheless be "an act of injustice" unintended by the legislature, and
"contrary to common right and reason," "natural equity," and "Magna
Carta"-common law code for violations of natural and customary rights:
For there were certain fixed and established rules, founded on the
reason and fitness of things, which were paramount to all statutes;
and if laws are made against those principles, they are null and void.
For instance, statutes made against common right and reason, are
void. So statutes made against natural equity, are void; and so also
are statutes made against Magna Carta.237
The court agreed, declaring that it "is clear, that statutes passed against the
plain and obvious principles of common right, and common reason, are
absolutely null and void, as far as they are calculated to operate against those
principles,"238 and holding that it was obligated to construe the statute in a
manner "consistent with justice, and the dictates of natural reason, though
contrary to the strict letter of the law. 239 As Dean Treanor has observed,
eighteenth-century courts often avoided unjust results by construing a statute
not to apply to a situation that was clearly within its language, a practice akin
to declaring a statute unconstitutional "as applied" to a particular individual or
situation.24° Thus, noting that application of the statute against defendants
"would be evidently against common reason,"241 the court held that the
legislature must not have intended the statute to apply to persons in the
defendants' situation, and the jury accordingly returned a verdict for the
defendants.
242
On the other hand, several courts declined to decide cases on the basis of
higher-law constitutionalism and instead relied directly on the texts of
237 Id. at 93-94 (letters modernized) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
238 Id. at 95-96 (emphasis omitted).
239 Id. at 96.
240 William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REv. 455, 500-01 (2005).
241 McClaws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 96 (emphasis omitted).
242 Id. Symsbury Case might be added to Trevett, Rutgers, Butler, and McClaws as yet another example
of post-revolutionary reliance on higher-law constitutionalism, but the reporter's failure to state clearly either
the court's reasoning or counsel's arguments makes it difficult to determine whether the court relied on higher-
law reasoning and authority in deciding the case. See Symsbury Case, 1 Kirby 444, 452-53 (Conn. 1785)
(holding legislative act that settled a municipal boundary dispute by divesting the town of title to certain
property described in its charter invalid, on the ground that the legislature lacked power to divest the town of
title without the town's consent).
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enumerated rights. In Holmes v. Walton,243 for example, a defendant found
guilty of illicit war trade with the British protested the confiscation of his
smuggled goods because he had been tried to a six-person jury, "contrary to
the constitution, practices, and laws of the land," even though the New Jersey
constitution neither contained a twelve-person-jury guarantee nor a law-of-the-
land clause.244 The court declined the invitation to decide the case according
to Chapter 29 and instead construed the general jury-trial guarantee in the New
Jersey constitution to require twelve-person juries, based on the "common law
of England," "immemorial custom," and prior colonial charters.2 45 Likewise,
Bayard v. Singleton invalidated a North Carolina statute that eliminated the
right to a jury trial in certain property disputes where the title devolved from a
British sympathizer, based on the North Carolina constitution's law-of-the-land
and jury-trial clauses, which the court called "the fundamental law of the
land.
, 246
Finally, one other authority from this period requires extended discussion.
In early 1787, Alexander Hamilton delivered a speech to the New York
legislature in which he explicated the meaning of New York's law-of-the-land
clause. Perhaps because Hamilton and New York had multiple connections
with higher-law constitutionalism and the concept of due process during the
founding era,247 this speech is widely cited in the debate about the original
meaning of the Due Process Clause.
In a debate on a proposed statute that would have prohibited privateers who
sailed for the British during the Revolution from holding public office in New
York, 248 Hamilton argued that the statute violated the New York constitution's
law-of-the-land clause, as well as a due process clause enacted only weeks
earlier as part of a statutory bill of rights:
243 Holmes v. Walton (N.J. 1780), reported by Austin Scott, Holmes v. Walton: The New Jersey
Precedent, 4 AM. HIST. REV. 456 (1899), cited and described in State v. Parkhurst, 9 NIL. 427 app. (1802).
244 Scott, supra note 243, at 456-58.
245 Id. at 458-59.
246 Bayard v. Singleton, I N.C. (Mart.) 42,45 (1787).
247 Hamilton was counsel to the plaintiff in Rutgers v. Waddington, a principal author of The Federalist-
and sole author of its essays on judicial review-and a resident of New York, which was the only state to
suggest an amendment to the Constitution guaranteeing the "due process of law" rather than the "law of the
land." Some commentators believe that Madison lifted the language of the Due Process Clause directly from
New York's suggested amendment. E.g., MEYER, supra note 8, at 148; SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS, supra
note 94, at 151-54.
248 See Ely, Oxymoron Reconsidered, supra note 29, at 325-26.
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Some gentlemen hold that the law of the land will include an act of
the legislature. But Lord Coke, that great luminary of the law, in his
comment upon a similar clause in Magna Charta, interprets the law
of the land to mean presentment and indictment, and process of
outlawry, as contradistinguished from trial by jury. But if there were
any doubt upon the constitution, the bill of rights enacted in this very
session removes it. It is there declared that, no man shall be
disfranchised or deprived of any right, but by due process of law, or
the judgment of his peers. The words "due process" have a precise
technical import, and are only applicable to the process and
proceedings of the courts of justice; they can never be referred to an
act of legislature.
249
Some commentators have seized upon the last sentence of this quotation as
conclusive proof that Hamilton did not believe that the legislature was limited
by the concept of due process. 25°  In fact, Hamilton was actually arguing
precisely the opposite, by expressly adopting Coke's equation of the "law of
the land" with the "due process of law." 25 ' Coke may have been mistaken in
equating these two phrases, but, as Hamilton's argument illustrates, Coke's
position was widely held in late eighteenth-century America.
252
Hamilton believed that the proposed statute violated the statutory due
process clause. 253  If this belief was not clear from his initial statement, any
249 Alexander Hamilton, Remarks on an Act for Regulating Elections, New York Assembly (Feb. 6,
1787), in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (Harold C. Syrett ed., Columbia Univ. Press 1962),
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 313 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
250 See, e.g., Berger, "Law of the Land," supra note 8, at 12 (noting Hamilton's remarks in conjunction
with the view that due process applies to court procedure, not acts of the legislature).
251 See supra text accompanying note 118.
252 E.g., Butler v. Craig, 2 H. & McH. 214, 233-34 (Md. 1787); see, e.g., ORTH, supra note 72, at 31, 100;
Ely, Oxymoron Reconsidered, supra note 29, at 325; Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution,
64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 218 (1988); Riggs, supra note 29, at 992-93; Whitten, supra note 8, at 741-42;
Wolfe, supra note 8, at 221; see also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272, 276 (1856) (equating the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment with the
law-of-the-land clause of Chapter 29); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83
VA. L. REV. 493, 542-43 (1997) (observing that the "equivalence of due process clauses and clauses
forbidding deprivations of life, liberty, or property except by 'the law of the land' was "a commonplace of
nineteenth century constitutional law").
Other commentators acknowledge that late eighteenth-century Americans equated "law of the land"
with "due process of law," but argue either that these phrases were not understood to guarantee substantive
rights, see, e.g., BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 223-24; Reeder, supra note 8, at 197;
Whitten, supra note 8, at 742, 794-95; or that this equation was a historical error perpetrated by Coke, see,
e.g., 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 8, at 1103; MEYER, supra note 8, at 130, 137, 140; Jurow, supra note 8, at 271-
72, 279; Whitten, supra note 8, at 741.
253 See Ely, Oxymoron Reconsidered, supra note 29, at 326.
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ambiguity was removed by the two rhetorical questions he asked immediately
after: "Are we willing then to endure the inconsistency of passing a bill of
rights, and committing a direct violation of it in the same session? In short, are
we ready to destroy its foundations at the moment they are laid?
' 254
Coke may not actually have held the position that the law of the land or the
due process of law limited Parliament, but late eighteenth-century Americans
believed that he did, and this belief was a cornerstone of their constitutional
argument against British control of the colonies. 5  At a minimum, then,
Hamilton's speech is strong evidence of his twin beliefs that the law-of-the-
land and the due process clauses were synonymous and that they bound the
legislature as well as the executive.
Finally, it is likely that Hamilton understood both clauses to have imposed
substantive as well as procedural limitations on legislative action. Hamilton
argued that the process by which a legislature enacts a law does not satisfy the
guarantee of process owed under New York's statutory due process clause,
which he considered a guarantee of judicial, rather than legislative, process.25 6
In other words, a legislature's mere compliance with the formal requirements
for enacting a law did not mean that its acts necessarily accorded with the "law
of the land," or constituted the "process of law" owed to a person suffering a
deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Moreover, by citing Coke, Magna
Carta, and due process, Hamilton invoked three weighty symbols of higher-law
constitutionalism in opposition to the contemplated legislative deprivations of
the customary right to vote.257 Once again, it seems unlikely that Hamilton
would have cited such trenchant symbols of substantive limits on legislative
action if he did not believe that they imposed any such limits.
Hamilton seems to have adapted an argument about vested real property
rights to the more esoteric "property" suggested by rights to an office. A
legislature violates the "law of the land" or the "due process of law" when it
deprives a person of title to property without a trial by jury because this right
was a procedural right long recognized at common law. However, the
government also violates the "law of the land" or the "due process of law" by
254 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 249, at 35-36, quoted in Ely, Oxymoron
Reconsidered, supra note 29, at 326.
255 See supra notes 190-93, 206.
256 See WooD, supra note 147, at 454 (noting Hamilton's argument that terms of the New York
constitution guaranteeing due process of law "were applicable only to the proceedings of courts of justice").
257 Ely, Oxymoron Reconsidered, supra note 29, at 326; ORTH, supra note 72, at 7-8 & n.9 (author's
translation).
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depriving a person of title to property for a private purpose without
compensation because the common law had long recognized public purpose
and due compensation as substantive restrictions on the government's exercise
of its sovereign power of eminent domain.
258
Hamilton's position constitutes support for substantive due process if one
assumes that rights to political participation were considered a kind of property
in the late eighteenth century; in that case, those rights could not have been
taken by legislative act. Even without this assumption, it is difficult to see how
Hamilton's speech constitutes support for the narrow procedural understanding
of due process because he follows Coke in equating the law of the land with
due process of law, as well as the American reading of Coke that these two
concepts limited legislative power. It is improbable that Hamilton would
accept these two central aspects of higher-law constitutionalism, while
rejecting the third aspect of substantive limitation.
D. Unenumerated Rights in the Drafting and Ratification of the Constitution
By the time the Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia during
the summer of 1787, most of the states in existence since 1776 had been
governing for some years under positively enacted or affirmed frames of
government that had replaced their colonial administrations, together with
textual declarations or enumerations of at least some natural and customary
rights, including a Chapter 29 analogue.259 There were two basic models. One
model, adopted by seven states (including Vermont), enacted a frame of
258 For example, Symsbury Case is a vested property rights decision that sounds in substantive due
process, though the court did not cite either a state law-of-the-land clause or Chapter 29. See generally supra
note 242. Symsbury reviewed an act of the Connecticut colonial legislature purporting to resolve a boundary
dispute by confirming title in one of the parties. Id. The court held the statute void as beyond the legislative
power, and further held that the town of Symnsbury had title to the disputed property because its grant was prior
in time to that of the defendant, reasoning as follows:
[The statute] could not legally operate to curtail the land before granted to the proprietors of the
town of Symsbury, without their consent; and the grant to Symsbury being prior to the grant
made to the towns of Hargord and Windsor, under which the defendant claims, we are of the
opinion the title of the lands demanded is in the plaintiffs.
I Kirby 444, 447 (Conn. 1785) (letters modemized); accord Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 245 (1796)
(holding that the alteration of the terms of Revolutionary War debts mandated by the Treaty of 1783 violated
"immutable principles of justice" whose existence predated their textual declaration in the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment). Dean Treanor reads the Symsbury holding as authority for the proposition that "dispute
resolution concerning competing claims to property was a matter for the courts, not the legislature." See
Treanor, supra note 240, at 488.
259 See supra Part II.C.
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government and recognized an extensive list of natural and customary rights
from the English constitution as adapted by the colonists in their conflicts with
Britain prior to independence. 260  The other model, followed by six other
states, enacted a frame of government and interwove within that enactment the
declaration of a few natural and customary rights and liberties from the English
constitution. 26 1  Both models were premised on the notion that natural and
customary rights preexisted state governments and bound state executives and
legislatures regardless of whether they were textually enumerated in a
262constitutional writing. As Professor Corwin once emphatically pronounced,
'judicial review initially had nothing to do with a written constitution.
263
Although there is little evidence of a conscious decision to choose one
model over the other, the document produced by the Philadelphia Convention
in fact reflected the sensibilities of the second model. 264  Virtually all of the
provisions of the 1787 Constitution framed the three branches of the national
government or defined their relationship with each other or the states. The
265Constitution enumerated very few individual rights and liberties, and even
these were criticized by some delegates as "irrelevant and useless." 266  A
suggestion near the end of the Convention to include a bill of rights in the
Constitution did not draw the support of a single state delegation.26 7
When the Convention reported the Constitution to the states for ratification,
however, the lack of a national bill of rights in the Constitution emerged as an
260 See infra app. (Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont,
and Virginia).
261 See infra app. (Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, New Jersey, New York, and South Carolina).
262 See Corwin, Natural Law, supra note 132, at 58; cf McCormack, Lochner, supra note 148, at 446-47
(observing that the "unwritten law" of natural fights "places limits on the claims that government can make on
an individual, and posits that those claims are not dependent on human laws and constitutions but belong
naturally to all persons").
263 Corwin, Natural Law, supra note 132, at 58.
264 SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 94, at 78; see WOOD, supra note 147, at 536 ("A bill of
rights had scarcely been discussed in the Philadelphia Convention."); Haines, supra note 8, at 419; Pound,
supra note 122, at 356 (noting that a bill of rights was given little consideration because "the powers of the
federal government were only those given it by the Constitution, and it was thought that power to do things
feared and guarded in by bills of rights, had not been given to the general government").
265 Excluding the provisions that once protected property in slaves, the 1787 constitutional text
enumerates only individual rights against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, state interference with contractual obligations, and state deprivation of the privileges and immunities
of nonresidents. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cls. 1-3; id. § 10, cl. 1; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
266 WOOD, supra note 147, at 536.
267 RAKOVE, supra note 159, at 288.
[Vol. 58
2009] AN ORIGINALIST DEFENSE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 635
issue almost immediately. 268  The Anti-Federalists focused on the Necessary
and Proper and Supremacy Clauses, arguing that the former would permit the
national government to exercise implied powers and that the latter would
render state constitutions ineffective in protecting natural and customary rights
against the use of implied powers. 269  They also emphasized (with some
exaggeration) that virtually every state had a constitutional declaration or
reservation of fundamental rights and liberties. 27° Even Thomas Jefferson, a
supporter of the original Constitution who was serving as Ambassador to
France during the Convention and ratification debates, saw the lack of a federal
bill or declaration of rights as a serious flaw.
27 1
The Federalists made two arguments in reply. First, they maintained that
an enumeration of natural and customary rights was unnecessary, because the
Constitution nowhere delegated to the national government any power to
infringe upon such rights. 272 Second, they argued that an enumeration of rights
268 E.g., Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph (Oct. 16, 1787), in VA. GAz.
(Petersberg), Dec. 6, 1787 (attacking the Constitution for its lack of a bill of rights), reprinted in I THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 465, 467, 470 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993); Letter from James Madison to
George Washington (Sept. 30, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 42, 43 (recounting
Lee's attempt to persuade the Confederacy Congress to add a bill of rights to the Constitution before referring
it to the states for ratification); see SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 66 (1995) (noting that
the Anti-Federalists' "chief objection" was "the absence of a bill of rights"); RAKOVE, supra note 159, at 147
(emphasizing the Anti-Federalists' conviction that "no republican constitution could be complete or safe unless
it contained a declaration of the reserved rights of the people"); STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at
220 ("After the Convention ... the Anti-Federalists made the lack of a bill of rights a rallying cry of their
opposition."); WOOD, supra note 147, at 536-37 ("[O]nce the Antifederalists grasped the consolidating aspects
of the new Constitution... they rose in defense of a declaration of rights .... ").
269 E.g., George Mason, Objections to the Constitution, VA. J. (Alexandria), Nov. 12, 1787, reprinted in I
THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 345, 348; George Mason Fears for the Rights of the
People (Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 4, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
268, at 605-06, 609; George Mason Fears the Power of the Federal Courts: What Will Be Left to the States?
(Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 19, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at
720-21; An Old Whig (Oct. 12, 1787), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 122-26;
Brutus 11 (Nov. 1, 1787), in THE ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS 295, 299 (Gordon Lloyd & Margie Lloyd eds.,
1998); see RAKOVE, supra note 159, at 146; WOOD, supra note 147, at 536; Mark Graber, Enumeration and
Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting Rights: The View from 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357,
377-78 (2006).
270 WOOD, supra note 147, at 537; e.g., Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 16,
1787), in VA. GAz. (Petersberg), Dec. 6, 1787, reprinted in I THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
268, at 465, 470.
271 See WOOD, supra note 147, at 537.
272 E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 218, at 578-79; see, e.g., James
Wilson's Speech at a Public Meeting (Oct. 6, 1787), in I THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268,
at 63-64; Remarks of Thomas McKean, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 226, at 641, 643; Remarks of James Wilson, Pennsylvania
Ratifying Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 226, at
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and liberties against the national government would supply a dangerous basis
for recognizing unenumerated governmental powers. 27' They argued that
delegates could not possibly enumerate all of the rights and liberties
individuals held and that those that were not enumerated would be presumed to
have been ceded to the national government or not to exist at all.274
Both Federalist arguments were undermined by the Constitution's
enumeration of a few natural and customary rights, 275 as Anti-Federalists were
quick to argue. 276 Nevertheless, both Federalist arguments rested on the twin
assumptions that natural and customary rights existed independently of the
federal Constitution or any other text, and that the federal judiciary would be
empowered to invalidate acts of Congress or state legislatures intruding upon
277such rights. For example, Edmund Randolph argued during the Philadelphia
633-46; Remarks of James [redell, North Carolina Convention Debates (July 29, 1788), in 2 THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 226, at 945,949-51.
273 E.g., James Wilson's Speech at a Public Meeting (Oct. 6, 1787), in I THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 63-64 (arguing that because in case of state constitutional powers, "every
thing which is not reserved is given," whereas in case of federal constitutional powers, "every thing which is
not given is reserved," it would have been "superfluous and absurd" for the Constitution to enumerate rights
"of which we are not divested"); THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 218, at 579
(arguing that bills of rights "are not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but would even be
dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted; and on this very account,
would afford a colourable pretext to claim more than were granted").
274 E.g., James Wilson and John Smilie Debate the Need for a Bill of Rights, Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in I THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 807-08 ("[F]or who
will be bold enough to undertake to enumerate all the rights of the people? And when the attempt to
enumerate them is made, it must be remembered that if the enumeration is not complete, every thing not
expressly mentioned will be presumed to be purposely omitted."); Remarks of James Iredell at North Carolina
Convention Debates (July 29, 1788), in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 226, at
945, 949-51; see Graber, supra note 269, at 18 (noting the Federalists' concern "that textual guarantees for
presently acknowledged liberties might inhibit protection for liberties acknowledged in the future"); Sherry,
supra note 29, at 1162 ("A limited enumeration, [the Federalists] argued, would inaccurately imply that the
rights themselves were limited to those enumerated.").
275 See supra note 265.
276 E.g., James Wilson and John Smilie Debate the Need for a Bill of Rights, Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in I THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 807-10 ("It seems
however that the members of the federal convention were themselves convinced, in some degree, of the
expediency and propriety of a bill of rights, for we find them expressly declaring that the writ of Habeas
Corpus and the trial by jury in criminal cases shall not be suspended or infringed."); Brutus 11 (Nov. 1, 1787),
in THE ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 269, at 299 (asserting that the drafters of the Constitution
"would not have made certain reservations, while they totally omitted others of more importance").
277 STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 199, 208 (arguing that the framers intended the courts as
the "immediate guarantor" of justice and the guardians against "unjust and partial" laws); see Randy E.
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEx. L. REV. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Barnett, Ninth
Amendment] (arguing that the Ninth Amendment was designed to address Federalist arguments about the
dangers of enumerating natural and customary rights by ensuring that such rights retained the same
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Convention that "any individual conceiving himself injured or oppressed by
the partiality or injustice of a law of any particular State may resort to the
National Judiciary, who may adjudge such law to be void, if found contrary to
the principles of equity and justice. 278 Theophilus Parsons similarly argued
during the Massachusetts ratifying convention that a bill of rights limiting the
national government was unnecessary; because the Constitution did not give
the national government power to infringe upon natural rights, any such
infringement would be void and unenforceable.2 79  Hamilton's essay on the
judiciary is likewise permeated by the presupposition that the federal courts
would defend unenumerated natural and customary rights beyond those few
enumerated in the constitutional text; 28  indeed, some commentators have
fundamental stature after ratification of the Bill of Rights as they had enjoyed before); Haines, supra note 8, at
279 (arguing that the Federalists expected the federal judiciary to protect "vested rights of property and
contract, both by express and implied constitutional limitations").
278 Edmund Randolph, Suggestions for the Conciliation of the Small States 5 (July 10, 1787), in 4 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 249, at 597.
279 2 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 161-62 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.,
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] ("[N]o power was given to Congress to
infringe on any one of the natural rights of the people by this Constitution; and should they attempt it without
constitutional authority, the act would be a nullity, and could not be enforced."); Massachusetts Convention
Debates (Jan. 23, 1788), in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 226, at 681, 688
("Is there a single natural right we enjoy, uncontrolled by our own legislature, that Congress can infringe? Not
one. Is there a single political right secured to us by our constitution, against the attempts of our own
legislature, which we are deprived of by this Constitution? Not one, that I recollect.").
280 Throughout Federalist No. 78, Hamilton generally distinguishes the "rights of individuals" as separate
from and in addition to the "constitution." THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 218, at
527 ('This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the constitution and the rights of
individuals" from unusual federal actions that might seriously burden political minorities (emphasis added));
id. at 529 (referring to the indispensability of "inflexibility and uniform adherence to the rights of the
constitution and of individuals" (emphasis added)); accord id. at 528.
But it is not with a view to infractions of the constitutions only that the independence of the
judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humours in the society.
These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of
citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast
importance in mitigating the severity, and confining the operation, of such laws. It not only
serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates
as a check upon the legislative body in passing them ....
Id. (emphasis added). At one point, Hamilton seems to contradict himself by limiting the reach of the courts to
enumerated rights, see id. at 524 ("By a limited constitution I understand one which contains certain specified
exceptions to the legislative authority; such for instance as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post
facto laws, and the like."), but the immediately following sentence returns to the assumption that the judicial
power extends to the protection of rights beyond the four comers of the constitutional text, see id.
("Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of
justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void."
(emphasis added)).
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flatly concluded that Federalist No. 78 is basically an argument for judicial
enforcement of unenumerated natural and customary rights.281 Finally, while
some framers preferred to speak in terms of judicial enforcement of limits on
the enumerated powers rather than judicial protection of individual rights,282
the two were generally understood as functional equivalents.28 3
Anti-Federalist arguments were more equivocal. Anti-Federalist criticism
that the Constitution failed to include a declaration of natural and customary
rights shared the Federalist assumption that such rights already existed even
though they were not textually enumerated. The Anti-Federalists, however,
believed that failure to declare the existence of these rights in a textual
enumeration made them less secure. For example, one form of Anti-Federalist
criticism was that the lack of a bill of rights meant that the Constitution would
not protect the natural and customary rights of citizens, and would thus fail in
the very purpose of republican government. As one Anti-Federalist argued, the
Constitution not only rendered state declarations of rights ineffectual by virtue
of the Supremacy Clause, but the Constitution was also "proposed without any
kind of stipulation for any of those natural rights, the security whereof ought to
,,284be the end of all governments.' Less specifically, George Mason opposed
the Constitution because it failed to secure the people's right to "the enjoyment
of the benefits of the common law" and its Supremacy Clause rendered
281 See, e.g., GERBER, supra note 268, at 112-13 (arguing that an "often overlooked" aspect of Federalist
No. 78 "is Hamilton's explanation about the primary reason judicial review is necessary: to help protect the
natural rights of the American people"); STONER, LIBERAL THEORY, supra note 70, at 204 ("Hamilton grants
the courts the power to declare void statutes they find in violation of the Constitution and even to limit statutes
which, though not infringing the document itself, nonetheless threaten justice or constrict rights.").
282 E.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 279, at 443 (remarks of George Nicholas at the Virginia
ratifying convention) ("But ... who is to determine the extent of [the enumerated] powers? I say, the same
power which, in all well-regulated communities, determines the extent of legislative powers. If they exceed
these powers, the judiciary will declare it void, or else the people will have a right to declare it void."); 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 279, at 196 (remarks of Oliver Ellsworth at the Connecticut ratifying
convention) ("This Constitution defines the extent of the powers of the general government. If the general
legislature should at any time overleap their limits, the judicial department is a constitutional check. If the
United States go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void;
and the judicial power, the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are to be made independent, will
declare it to be void."); see Hill, supra note 29, at 1313-14 (attributing to the Federalists the view that "the
legislature exceeds its delegated powers when it impairs fundamental rights, even in the absence of express
constitutional limits on those powers").
283 See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 226, at 1189, 1190 ("If a line can be drawn between the powers
granted and the rights retained, it would seem to be the same thing whether the latter be secured by declaring
that they shall not be abridged, or that the former shall not be extended.").
284 Essay by the Impartial Examiner, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 5, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL
OF RIGHTS 357-58 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
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nugatory even those state constitutional provisions that expressly affirmed the
common law.285
Some criticism in this vein, however, seemed to presuppose that the natural
and customary rights left without explicit textual protection were purely
procedural. For example, in one of his "Federal Farmer" essays, Richard
Henry Lee made clear his belief that Chapter 29 of Magna Carta protected
286
unwritten natural and customary procedural rights and liberties. He also
expressed skepticism that these rights would be protected in the absence of
enumeration; because the United States was so new, Lee did not believe that
Americans would be recognized as holding any fundamental rights by
"immemorial usage."
287
The Anti-Federalists won the bill-of-rights battle, although the Federalists
won the ratification war. In Massachusetts, 288 New York,
289 and Virginia, 290
three states whose approval was essential for organization of a viable national
government, a majority opposed ratification without a bill of rights.291 The
necessary majority in these states was obtained only after pro-ratification
forces promised amendment of the Constitution to include a bill of rights once
the post-ratification national government was organized. 292  Even so, the
ratification margins were dangerously narrow. In all, seven states, including
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia, proposed amendments as part of their
ratification; New York, North Carolina, and Virginia included a paraphrase of
Chapter 29 in their proposed amendments.
293
285 George Mason, Objections to the Constitution of Government Formed by the Convention (Oct. 1787),
in I THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 268, at 346.
286 Richard Henry Lee, The Federal Farmer, No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 284, at 356.
287 Id. at 357.
288 RAKOVE, supra note 159, at 188-200.
289 Id. at 125-28.
290 Id. at 122-25.
291 ld. at 113-14.
292 Id. at 96, 116, 120.
293 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 284, 1 10.1.2.1-4, at 348-49; 2 THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 269, at 537, 560, 567.
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III. AN ORIGINALIST READING OF THE "DUE PROCESS OF LAW" IN THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT
While the early eighteenth century saw Britain slowly moving away from
the seventeenth-century higher-law constitutionalism of Coke toward the new
constitutionalism of parliamentary supremacy, Coke's higher-law
constitutionalism remained highly influential in the colonies. When Britain
began to intervene more closely in colonial affairs, the colonists adapted
higher-law constitutionalism as a defense to the consequent taxation and
regulation of their internal affairs, as illustrated by the arguments of counsel in
Paxton's Case294 and Robin v. Hardaway,295 which were popularized as thefoundation of colonial arguments under the English constitution.
The colonists also adopted the confused seventeenth-century notion that the
common law reflected the natural law and natural rights, 296 carrying it into the
Declaration of Independence. 297  Following independence, they adopted
written constitutions that created republican frames of government, but which
merely declared or guaranteed already existing natural and customary rights.
The Federalist defense of the Philadelphia Convention's near-complete failure
to protect such rights in the 1787 Constitution reflected the higher-law belief
that such rights were enforceable against federal and state government action
independent of any constitutional enumeration or writing. All these
perspectives are confirmed in post-revolutionary decisions reported after
independence.
298
Therefore, by 1790 when Madison set out to draft the Fifth Amendment
and the rest of the Bill of Rights, the Americans had adopted, adapted, and
embedded the higher-law constitutionalism of Coke and the English
seventeenth century into their constitutional thinking. In particular, the notion
of the "due process of law," associated with the "law of the land" guaranteed
by Chapter 29 of Magna Carta, was understood to include a residual guarantee
of substantive liberty against arbitrary actions of government, including
(especially) those of the state legislatures.
294 Paxton's Case, supra note 163, app. I-D, at 474 (report of John Adams).
295 1 Va. (Jeff.) 109 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1772).
296 See supra text accompanying notes 199-202.
297 See supra text accompanying note 211.
298 See supra Part 111.B.2.
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A. The Drafting and Ratification of the Due Process Clause
Following ratification and election of the First Congress, James Madison
introduced a package of twelve proposed amendments, which he had drafted to
address state concerns over the Constitution's lack of a bill of rights. The Due
Process Clause was contained in one of these proposed amendments:
No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more
than one punishment, or one trial for the same offence; nor shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor be obliged to
relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use,
.... 299
without a just compensation.
Although this proposed amendment underwent significant changes before it
was reported out to the states and ratified, there is no record of any discussion
of the Due Process Clause itself in any of the ensuing reports or debates of the
proposed amendments.
The proposed amendment containing the Due Process Clause was reported
out of the House on August 24, 1789,300 and a somewhat different version
reported out of the Senate on September 9, 1789.301 Following House-Senate
conference negotiations, the final version of the proposed amendment
containing the Due Process Clause was reported to the states as "Article the
seventh" in a joint resolution of the House and Senate on September 28, 1789:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case,
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation. 302
The seventh proposed amendment, containing the Due Process Clause, was
ratified as the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution on December 15, 1791.
299 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451-52 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (proposal of James Madison on June 8, 1789)
(emphasis added), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 284, 10.1.1.1 .a, at 337.
300 Id. at 808-09, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 284,1 10.1.1.8, at 340.
301 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 284, 10.1.1.12, at 342 (citation omitted).
302 Id. 1 10.1.1.22, at 348 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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B. "Law" in Late Eighteenth-Century America
1. The Classical Understanding of "Law"
The argument for an exclusively procedural understanding of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause implicitly projects an anachronistic positivist
meaning onto the term "law" in the crucial phrase "due process of law." In
this positivist understanding, a "law" is any legislative or other governmental
act that has satisfied the rule of recognition; in other words, any such act that
effects a deprivation of life, liberty, or property necessarily comports with the
due process of law because the act that effects the deprivation has satisfied the
formal requirements for lawmaking. 303 Under this reading, Congress complies
with the Due Process Clause-that is, it satisfies the "due process of law" in
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property-so long as it accomplishes the
deprivation by means of a congressional act passed in accordance with the
lawmaking provisions of Article I of the Constitution.
By contrast, classical natural law theory has long assigned normative as
well as positivist content to the definition of "law." 3°5  To fall within the
meaning of "law" in the classical view, a legislative or other governmental act
required more than mere positivist compliance with the rule of recognition; it
also needed to be just.3° 6  Cicero, for example, maintained that an unjust
303 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method
in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1221, 1297 n.247 (1995).
[I]f one reads the word "law" as late twentieth century speakers use that word ... [,] then one
cannot easily explain how something that has the form of law, and that was enacted in accord
with all relevant structural requirements for lawmaking by the relevant juridical entities, is to be
treated as something less than "law" simply because its substantive content flunks various tests,
either static or evolving, for how lawmakers may regulate various spheres of economic or social
life.
Id.; cf James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 155 (1893) ("No doubt our doctrine of constitutional law has had a tendency to drive out questions
of justice and right, and to fill the minds of legislators with thoughts of mere legality, of what the constitution
allows.").
304 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3 (providing that a congressional act becomes law when passed by a
majority of the Senate and the House and either signed by the President, allowed to become law without his
signature, or reenacted by a two-thirds majority of each of the Senate and the House over a presidential veto).
305 See, e.g., PLUCKNET-r, supra note 67, at 40 (arguing that the idea of "law which was directly based
upon the divine attribute ofjustice" proved to be both a practical and an intellectual answer to social problems
in the middle ages).
306 E.g., CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, DE LEGIBUs 385 (Clinton Walker Keyes trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1928) (51 BCE) ("[lin the very definition of the term 'law' there inheres the idea and principle of choosing
what is just and true."); id. at 317-19 ("[The origin of Justice is to be found in Law, for Law is a natural force;
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statute, even though clearly adopted and accepted by the nation it governs, is
not a "law." 307 Augustine likewise suggested that "a law that is not just is not a
law." 3°8 Aquinas formalized this view into the argument that since law derived
its essential character from its conformity to "right reason," whose "first rule is
the law of nature," a law that violates the natural law "is no longer a law but a
corruption of law."
3 °9
it is the mind and reason of the intelligent man, the standard by which Justice and Injustice are measured.");
see SOPHIE VAN BUSTERVELD, THE EMPTY THRONE: DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN TRANSITION 239
(2002) (observing that natural law theorists "adopt the view that there is more to law than the authoritative and
correct establishment of a rule and the content of such rule. There are 'higher' truths or values which a
concrete rule, as it has been adopted, must reflect and adhere to"); id. at 15-16 (referring to the ancient and
medieval idea that natural law is "a standard of good law, ultimately superseding actual law"); Philip Soper, In
Defense of Classical Natural Law in Legal Theory: Why Unjust Law Is No Law at All, 20 CAN. J.L. JURIS. 201,
205 (2007) (attributing to classical natural law theory the view that positive laws "cannot count as law if they
are too unjust"); see also JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE
STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 185 (Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1955) (1832) (criticizing as "stark nonsense" the
classical view that "human laws which conflict with the Divine law are not binding, that is to say, are not
laws").
307 CICERO, supra note 306, at 385.
What of the many deadly, the many pestilential statutes which nations put in force? These no
more deserve to be called laws than the rules a band of robbers might pass in their assembly. For
if ignorant and unskilful men have prescribed deadly poisons instead of healing drugs, these
cannot possibly be called physicians' prescriptions; neither in a nation can a statute of any sort be
called a law, even though the nation, in spite of its being a ruinous regulation, has accepted it.
Therefore Law is the distinction between things just and unjust ....
Id.; accord id. at 385-87 (concluding that only "those human laws which inflict punishment upon the wicked
but defend and protect the good" are properly called laws, and that "we must not consider or even call
anything else a law").
308 ST. AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL bk. i, Q. 5, at 11 (Anna S. Benjamin & L.H. Hackstaff
trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Company 1964) (ca. 395). In defending laws that justify killing in self-defense or as
part of a military force, Augustine declares, "We shall not, shall we, dare say that these laws are unjust--or
rather, are not laws at all, for I think that a law that is not just is not a law." Id.
309 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 95, art. 2, at 227-28 (Father Laurence Shapcote
trans., rev. by Daniel J. Sullivan, Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Inc. 2d ed. 1990) (internal citation omitted);
accord id., Q. 96, art. 4, at 233 (quoting AUGUSTINE, supra note 308, bk. i, Q. 5, at 11) (internal citation
omitted).
[L]aws may be unjust in two ways. First, by being contrary to human good .... either in respect
of the end, as when an authority imposes on his subjects burdensome laws, conducive not to the
common good but rather to his own cupidity or vainglory; or in respect of the author, as when a
man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to him; or in respect of the form, as
when burdens are imposed unequally on the community, although with a view to the common
good. The like are acts of violence rather than laws, because, as Augustine says, "a law that is
not just seems to be no law at all."
Id.; accord CICERO, supra note 306, at 317-19.
Law is the highest reason, implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to be done and
forbids the opposite. This reason, when firmly fixed and fully developed in the human mind, is
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The classical natural law tradition was still vibrant in late eighteenth-
century America, when the Fifth Amendment was drafted and ratified, and the
term "law" had not yet acquired the almost entirely positivist connotation that
it carries today. To call a legislative act a "law" during that era did not mean
that the act merely satisfied constitutional requirements for lawmaking, but
rather signified that it conformed to substantive limitations on legislative
power represented by natural and customary rights. Legislative acts that
violated these limitations would not have been considered "laws," even when
they satisfied the constitutional requirements for lawmaking. 311 In other
words, such an act might have given "due process," but the process owed and
given by the act would not have been a process of law. 312 Under this reading,
the Due Process Clause required that a congressional deprivation of life,
liberty, or property be accomplished by a "law," and to be a "law," a
Law.... Now if this is correct, . . . then the origin of Justice is to be found in Law, for Law is a
natural force; it is the mind and reason of the intelligent man, the standard by which Justice and
Injustice are measured.
Id.; see also RtMi BRAGUE, THE LAW OF GOD 221 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 2007) (attributing to Aquinas the
view that "the law cannot be reduced to a commandment that would merely be the imposition of a will. The
law is rational and, at least within itself, intelligible").
310 See supra text accompanying notes 192-202, 222-42; cf. Harrison, supra note 252, at 525 (describing
but not endorsing this definition of "law"); supra note 155 (noting reliance on this definition of "law" by
seventeenth century colonial court); Tribe, supra note 303, at 1297 n.247.
[T]he historical evidence points strongly toward the conclusion that, at least by 1868 even if not
in 1791, any state legislature voting to ratify a constitutional rule banning government
deprivations of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" would have understood
that ban as having substantive as well as procedural content, given that era's premise that, to
qualify as "law," an enactment would have to meet substantive requirements of rationality,
non-oppressiveness, and evenhandedness.
Id.
311 Cf. Harrison, supra note 252, at 525-26 (describing but not endorsing this definition of "law").
312 See, e.g., 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 8, at 1151 (describing without endorsing this reading of "due
process of law"); Harrison, supra note 252, at 525 (same); Wolfe, supra note 8, at 224 (same). As Professor
Wolfe explained, the emphasis on the "law" of "due process of law" suggested that
[i]f the law under which one is being deprived of life, liberty, or property turns out not to be a
law really-if it lacks some essential element of law-then it might be argued that such a law
violated the due process clause and that punishment under it (deprivation of life, liberty, and
property), was invalid, prohibited.
Id.
Professor Crosskey rejected this reading outright, although his analysis focused on the meaning of the
Due Process of Clause of the Fourteenth rather than the Fifth Amendment. See 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 8, at
1151. Professor Harrison similarly concludes that this reading is implausible for the Due Process Clause of
either Amendment. See Harrison, supra note 252, at 530-34. Wolfe, by contrast, finds this reading a plausible
one, though not the most plausible one. See Wolfe, supra note 8, at 224-26.
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congressional act must not have exceeded the limits of legislative power
marked by natural and customary rights.
2. Post-Independence Authorities and the Classical Understanding of
"Law"
Legal dictionaries from the late eighteenth century repeated Aquinas's
argument nearly verbatim, reasoning that because "laws" derive their
obligatory force from their conformity to the natural law, those that do not so
conform fall outside the definition of "law." '313  Echoing Aquinas,314 and
notwithstanding his ideas about Parliamentary supremacy, Blackstone
similarly concluded that "absurd or unjust" decisions were not simply "bad
law," but "not law" at all, because "what is not reason is not law."316 Indeed,
even in eighteenth-century England, there were members of Parliament who
argued that the more extreme acts passed by Parliament to regulate and punish
colonial intransigence were not "law" even though properly enacted.317
The classical understanding of law is implicit in the ubiquitous language of
nullity and voidness that runs throughout late eighteenth-century judicial
decisions and arguments of counsel involving legislative acts held to have
violated natural or customary rights.3 18  Then as now, a void law had no
existence; it made sense to think of it as never having been a "law" at all.
313 A NEW LAW DICTIONARY 405 (Giles Jacob ed., London, Woodfall & Strahan, 8th ed. 1762) ("All
Laws derive their Force a Lege Nature; and those which do not, are accounted as no Laws. No Law will make
a Construction to do wrong." (citing Sir John Fortescue, a judge on King's Bench during the reign of Henry
VI)); accord JOHN MILTON, DEFENCE OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND (1651), reprinted in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN
MILTON 204 (London, William Pickering 1851) (appealing to "that Fundamental Maxim in our Law.... by
which nothing is to be accounted a Law, that is contrary to the Laws of God, or of Reason"), quoted in I
JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW WITH NOTES 51 n.6 (Cambridge, Mass.,
University Press 1895); see also 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 714 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d
ed. 1989) ("What is or is considered right or proper; justice or correctness of conduct"; with usage examples
from 1200 to 1450).
The identical definition appeared in the "corrected and greatly enlarged" American edition of Jacob's
dictionary published in 1811. See 4 THE LAW-DICTIONARY 89 (T.E. Tomlins ed., Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1st
Am. ed. 1811).
314 See Soper, supra note 306, at 201.
315 See supra text accompanying note 149.
316 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70 (emphasis omitted).
317 See 4 REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 142, at 29-33.
318 For judicial opinions, see Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 18-20 (1800) (presupposing without
exercising judicial power to declare a state law "void" as contrary to state or federal constitution, or both)
(separate opinions of Washington, Chase, Paterson, & Cushing, JJ.); Bowman v. Middleton, I S.C.L. (1 Bay)
252, 254 (S.C. Ct. Coin. P1. 1792) (holding that legislative act resolving boundary dispute by vesting title in
one of the parties was "ipso facto void" because it violated Magna Carta and "common right"); Ham v.
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The classical understanding was sometimes even made explicit. For
example, the classical theory's normative definition of "law" is expressly
invoked in Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, a case involving a boundary
dispute between Pennsylvania and Connecticut, which the states settled by
legislatively vesting title to disputed property in certain claimants at the
expense of others. 319 The disappointed claimants challenged the settlement act
in the federal circuit trial court in diversity. Justice Paterson charged the jury
that the legislature's act of "divesting one citizen of his freehold and vesting it
in another, even with compensation" was "void" because it violated natural
and customary rights. 32  This charge meant, he explained, that the settlement
act "never had Constitutional existence; it is a dead letter, and of no more
virtue or avail, than if it never had been made."
321
The classical view is also explicit in Marbury v. Madison.322 Chief Justice
Marshall famously held in Marbury that "an act of the legislature, repugnant to
the constitution, is void., 323  Immediately thereafter, as he introduced the
question whether courts are bound to enforce an unconstitutional law, Marshall
expressly assumed that a legislative act found to be void because of its
inconsistency with the constitution is not really a "law": "If an act of the
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its
invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other
McClaws, I S.C.L. (I Bay) 91, 93, 98 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. 1789) (observing that "statutes passed against the
plain and obvious principles of common right, and common reason, are absolutely null and void, asfr as they
are calculated to operate against those principles," and declining to subject defendants to a statute enacted
while defendants were en route to the state on the high seas, because such application "would be evidently
against comnon reason").
For arguments of counsel, see Cooper, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 16 ("If a law is contrary to the constitution,
the law is void.") (argument for plaintiff); Paxton's Case, supra note 163, app. I-D, at 474 ("As to Acts of
Parliament, an Act against the Constitution is void; an Act against natural Equity is void; and if an Act of
Parliament should be made, in the very Words of this Petition, it would be void.") (argument of James Otis as
reported by John Adams); Trs. of the Univ. v. Foy, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 310, 325 (1804) (arguing that a
legislative act divesting state university of title to property lawfully conveyed by prior legislative act "is
against the constitution and void") (argument of John Haywood); Robin v. Hardaway, I Va. (Jeff.) 109, 114
(Va. Gen. Ct. 1772) ("[AIII acts of legislature apparently contrary to natural right and justice, are, in our laws,
and must be in the nature of things, considered as void.") (argument of George Mason).
319 Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 304, 28 F. Cas. 1012 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,857).
320 Id. at 310, 316; accord id, at 310 (labeling the act "inconsistent with the principles of reason, justice
and moral rectitude," "incompatible with the comfort, peace, and happiness of mankind," "contrary to the
principles of social alliance in every free government," and "contrary both to the letter and spirit of the [state]
Constitution"; in short, "what every one would think unreasonable and unjust in his own case").
321 Id. at 316.
322 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
323 Id. at 177.
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words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a
law?",
32 4
Finally, the classical understanding of "law" is clearly evident in state
judicial condemnations of the positivist construction of "law" in late
eighteenth-century decisions construing the meaning of the "law of the land."
These decisions illustrate the original meaning of the Due Process Clause
because late eighteenth-century Americans understood the meanings of the
"due process of law" and the "law of the land" to be identical. 325 For example,
two judges in Zylstra v. Corp. of Charleston emphatically held that a city
charter permitting the levying of fines without trial by jury could not be
considered part of the "law of the land" even if authorized by the legislature:
How then can a law be valid, which constrains a citizen to submit his
person and his property, to a tribunal, that proceeds to give judgment
on both, without the intervention of a jury? Does [sic] these words of
the constitution "or by the law of the land," authorise it? Do they
mean any law which may be passed, directing a different mode of
trial? Such a construction would be incompatible with the
declaration of this privilege; it would be taking away all the security
which that intended to give it; it would do more, it would be making
the constitution itself authorise the means of destroying a right which
it afterwards declares shall be inviolably preserved. For if the law
may abridge the trial by jury, it may also abolish it; and this great
privilege would be held only at the will of the legislature.
32 6
The author of this opinion later cited its reasoning in Lindsay v.
Commissioners to invalidate a municipal taking, arguing that if "the lex terrae
meant any law which the legislature might pass, then the legislature would be
authorized by the constitution, to destroy the right, which the constitution had
expressly declared, should for ever be inviolably preserved," and dismissing
this reading as "too absurd a construction to be the true one.'327  Trustees of
324 Id. (emphasis added).
Later in Marbury, however, Chief Justice Marshall uses the term "law" more loosely, as if it included
unconstitutional as well as constitutional legislative acts. See, e.g., id. at 178 (posing the question, "if a law be
in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case," whether "the
court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the
constitution, disregarding the law").
325 See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
326 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 382, 390-91 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. 1794) (per Waties, J., joined by Bay, J.).
327 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38, 59 (S.C. Const. Ct. App. 1796); see also Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 579-81 (1819) (arguing that the meaning of New Hampshire's "law of the land"
clause included recognition that "[e]verything which may pass under the form of an enactment, is not.. . to be
considered the law of the land") (argument of Daniel Webster); Currie's Adm'r v. Mutual Assurance Soc'y, 14
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the University of North Carolina v. Foy similarly rejected the positivist
construction when it invalidated a state legislature's unilateral revocation of
title to property that the legislature had previously conveyed, reasoning that if
the protections of the "law of the land" guaranteed by the North Carolina
constitution did not bind the legislature because the legislature was empowered
to alter the "law of the land" at will, the clause would be rendered a nullity.
328
Perhaps the clearest statement of the classical understanding of "law" is the
oft-quoted dictum of Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull, a U.S. Supreme Court
decision handed down in 1798, only seven years after the ratification of the
Fifth Amendment.329  In Calder, the Court reviewed a state statute that had
vacated a probate court's invalidation of a will and ordered a new trial of the
will despite the statute of limitations for appeals having run; the new trial
resulted in validation and recording of the will, which was upheld on appeal in
the state courts.
Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315, 346-47 (1809) (per Roane, J.) (rejecting argument of counsel that "the legislature had
a right to pass any law, however just, or unjust, reasonable, or unreasonable," and warning that such a
conception of untrammeled legislative power would "lay prostrate, at the footstool of the legislature, all our
rights of person and of property, and abandon those great objects, for the protection of which, alone, all free
governments have been instituted").
328 Trs. of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 58, 62 (1805); see also Trs. of the Univ. v. Foy, 3
N.C. (2 Hayw.) 310, 320-24 (1804) (argument of John Haywood).
I have heard it argued, that as the Legislature can make the law of the land by passing an act for
that purpose, that therefore this clause of the bill of rights, if taken as restrictive of their power, is
of little or no effect. And can there be a stronger argument to prove that the term law of the land
has some other meaning?
The meaning then of the term we are considering, was, that a man should not be deprived of his
freehold, &c. but by the judgment of a court of justice, regularly constituted and authorised to
decide what the law is, and to pronounce it in cases coming before them: which court shall
ascertain facts by the verdict of a jury, where proper; or where that would be improper, by such
other means as the law has appointed. How different is this from the idea which makes every act
of the Legislature a law of the land, and vests in them the arbitrary and despotic power of
prostrating all those rights so dear to mankind whenever they please! The term, law of the land,
had a precise legal meaning when used by the [North Carolina Constitutional] Convention, and
signified the lawful proceedings of the proper tribunals of the country.
If then the Trustees of the University be considered in the light of individuals, or of a common
corporation, the property which they had acquired could not be affected by any act of the
Legislature; nor could it be taken from them, but by the judgment of some proper court, having
sufficient jurisdiction, and proceeding, according to the known and established law of the land.
Id.
329 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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The issue before the Court was whether the statute violated the
Constitution's prohibition of ex post facto legislation by the states.330 The
Court unanimously upheld the statute, though on varying grounds.331 Beyond
this holding, most of the Justices also commented on the limits of legislative
power generally.332 Justice Chase opined that the legislative power was
constrained by natural and customary rights, even if these limits were not
declared by positive constitutional law:
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it
is absolute and without control; although its authority should not be
expressly restrained by the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the
State. The people of the United States erected their Constitutions, or
forms of government, to establish justice, to promote the general
welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect their persons
and property from violence.
3A
After making the Lockean argument that legislative power is limited by the
social contract, 334 Chase emphasized that such limits are not exhausted by
written constitutional restraints or other positive law enactments, and reiterated
that the principal purpose of both federal and state government is the
protection of natural and customary rights:
There are acts which the Federal, or State, Legislature cannot do,
without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles
in our free Republican governments, which will determine and over-
rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to
authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that
security for personal liberty, or private property, for the protection
whereof of the government was established.
3 35
As examples of acts beyond proper legislative authority, Chase suggested:
[A] law that punished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in other
words, for an act, which, when done, was in violation of no existing
law; a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful private contracts of
330 U.S. CONST, art. I, § 9. cl, 3.
331 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 386-87.
332 See POWELL, supra note 123, at 102 (arguing that one issue in Calder was whether constitutional
interpretation was restricted to "exegesis" of the constitutional text or might include "other sorts of political
arguments").
333 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 387-88 (letters modernized).
331 Id. at 388.
135 Id. Here and elsewhere, Chase made clear that his argument applies equally to congressional and state
legislative action. See id.
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citizens; a law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law
that takes property from A. and gives it to B.
3 36
Chase then directly invoked the classical view, arguing that because such
actions violate natural and customary rights, they are not "law" even when
enacted pursuant to the constitutionally prescribed procedures for lawmaking:
"An Act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first
principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of
legislative authority." 337 Chase ended with an explicit appeal to higher-law
constitutionalism: "The genius, the nature, and the spirit, of our State
Governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the
general principles of law and reason forbid them."
338
Justice Chase's famous invocation of the classical understanding was
directly challenged by the equally famous dictum of Justice Iredell in the same
case. Iredell argued that the only judicially enforceable limits on legislative
power were those positively enacted into a constitutional text:
If ... a government, composed of Legislative, Executive and Judicial
departments, were established, by a Constitution, which imposed no
limits on the legislative power, the consequence would inevitably be,
that whatever the legislative power chose to enact, would be lawfully
enacted, and the judicial power could never interpose to pronounce it
void.
33 9
His support for the conclusion that natural, customary, or other unwritten limits
on legislative power are not cognizable by the courts was none other than
Blackstone's doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.
340
Chase's position was almost certainly more widely held in the United
States of the 1790s. Blackstone's doctrine was a consequence of the
constitution of sovereign command, asserted by George III and the eighteenth-
century parliamentary majority in support of their governance of the colonies,
336 id.
337 Id. (emphasis added).
338 Id. Compare id., with THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison), supra note 218, at 301.
Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary
to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. The two
former are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the State Constitutions,
and all of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters.
Id.
319 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) at 398.
340 Id. at 398-99 (citation omitted).
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and resisted by the colonists, who had adopted the higher-law constitutionalism
of Coke and seventeenth-century England. As I have shown, post-
independence state constitutions, arguments of counsel, and judicial decisions
make clear that higher-law constitutionalism remained the conceptual
foundation of American constitutional thinking through the founding era.
Moreover, it was precisely the anarchic consequences stemming from actions
of state legislatures claiming absolute legislative power that led to the
Philadelphia Convention. 34 1 The supremacy of positive law, therefore, was an
unlikely constitutional argument for Justice Iredell to raise less than a
generation after the Revolution was fought to vindicate its constitutional
342opposite.
Justice Iredell's position, moreover, was largely rejected by state
constitutional decisions of the period, which generally held that the "law of the
land" signified natural and customary rights that constrained legislative action
and could not be altered by the exercise of ordinary legislative power. Only
two reported decisions relied on the legislative supremacy argued by Iredell in
his dictum. Toward the end of its opinion in Rutgers v. Waddington, the court
remarked that it was not necessary to question the "supremacy of the
Legislature," observing that "if they think fit positively to enact a law, there is
no power which can controul them," 343 a virtual quotation of Blackstone's
argument that a "law" is whatever the legislature positively enacts.
344
The court's holding in Rutgers, however, suggests the opposite. The court
decided the case under the law of nations-a branch of the natural law-
because the statute was subject to the common law, which included the law of
nations. 345  Notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, Rutgers held that
positive law must be construed so that it does not violate the common law,
thereby implicitly rejecting the positivist understanding. 346
341 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 203, at 106-07; WOOD, supra note 147, at 319.
342 See Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 277, at 30 n.122 (noting that James Wilson's lectures at the
University of Pennsylvania "undermine the claim that, by the time of the Constitution, Americans had lost
their Lockean and revolutionary ardor for natural rights in favor of a more conservative Blackstonian
positivism that favored legislative supremacy").
343 Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in I THE LAW PRACTICE OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 222, at 415. Compare supra Part 1.C.3, with supra text accompanying
notes 330-33.
344 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
345 Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in I THE LAW PRACTICE OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 222, at 399-415.
346 See supra text accompanying notes 222-24.
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The second case, State v. , involved a collection lawsuit by North
Carolina under a statute that permitted the attorney general to obtain judgments
against those in debt to the state without notice or trial on the validity of the
debt.347 The state made two motions for judgment against the defendant debtor
under the statute, both of which the court denied on the ground that the statute
violated North Carolina's law-of-the-land clause by depriving the debtor of his
customary rights to notice and jury trial before judgment.3 48  The state
maintained that the "law of the land" clause prohibited only deprivations
imposed by "foreign" law or royal prerogative, 349 that the clause could not bind
the legislature because the "law of the land" included legislative acts, and that
the legislature had full power to amend or alter common law rights as it saw fit
(including, presumably, the power to eliminate the customary rights of notice
and trial prior to judgment)."'
Undaunted, the state's attorney moved for judgment yet again on the same
grounds though before a different set of judges. Judge Ashe indicated that he
had "very considerable doubts" about the state's position, but deferred to the
confident opinion of his colleague that the statute was constitutionally sound.
Accordingly, Judge Ashe announced judgment for the attorney general under
the statute, though he confessed-in words that no doubt still resonate with
judges everywhere-that "he did not very well like it."351
Whatever modest precedential value attached to State v. - evaporated
when another North Carolina court expressly adopted the classical view of
"law" in construing the state law-of-the-land clause little more than a decade
later. Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Foy involved a challenge
to a state statute that funded the operation of the University of North Carolina
47 2 N.C. 28, 29, 1 Hayw. 38,39(1794).
348 Id. at 29, 1 Hayw. at 39 ("'No freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned or disseised of his freehold,
liberties, or property, &c. but by the law of the land'; and these words mean, according to the course of the
common law; which always required the party to be cited, and to have a day in court upon which he might
appear and defend himself [before a jury]." (quoting N.C. BILL OF RIGHTS art. 12)).
349 Id. at 33, 1 Hayw. at 43.
350 Id. at 33-34, 1 Hayw. at 44.
351 Id. at 40, 1 Hayw. at 50. The following is the reporter's account of Ashe's announcement of judgment:
Judge Ashe gave the opinion of the court, saying he and Judge Macay had conferred together-
that for himself he had very considerable doubts, but that Judge Macay was very clear in his
opinion that the judgments might be taken, and had given such strong reasons, that his (Judge
Ashe's) objections were vanquished, and therefore that the Attorney-General might proceed-but
that yet he did not very well like it.
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by granting the university title to "all the property that has heretofore or shall
hereafter escheat to the state. 352  A decade later, however, the legislature
repealed the prior funding act, held void the title to all property that the prior
act had vested in the university, and statutorily revested title back in the
state. 353  The university then challenged the constitutionality of the repeal
statute under, inter alia, the law-of-the-land clause in North Carolina's bill of
rights.354 The state's attorney argued, along the lines of the judgment in
State v. -, that the law-of-the-land clause "does not impose any
restrictions on the Legislature, who are capable of making the law of the
land., 355 This time, however, the court flatly rejected this construction of the
clause, noting that it would bind the courts to the will of the legislature,
"whether agreeable to their ideas of justice or not," and would render the law-
of-the-land clause "a dead letter.' 356 Concluding that the clause "is applicable
to the legislature" and must have been "intended as a restraint on their acts,"
the court went on to hold that it precluded the university from being deprived
of its "liberties or property, unless by a trial by jury in a court of justice,
according to the known and established rules of decision, derived from the
common law and such acts of the Legislature as are consistent with the
Constitution."
357
Therefore, by the time Foy was decided in 1805, it was well-established
that the meaning of "law" included the classical understanding argued by
Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull.358 The classical understanding of "law" was
reflected in the frequent references to voidness in constitutional decisions of
the era,359 and had been expressly invoked not only in Calder, but in the
majority opinions of two other federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme
Court.360  Finally, three state court opinions had used the classical
understanding as a premise in rejecting the positivist argument that state
legislatures had unrestricted power to alter the "law of the land" by ordinary
352 Trs. of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 57, 57 (1805).
113 Id. at 58.
314 Id. at 63.
311 Id. at 62.
356 Id. at 63.
357 Id.; see also id. (stating that the university's property was not subject to "the arbitrary will of the
Legislature" even though held in trust for the general good).
358 See supra text accompanying notes 331-36.
359 See supra text accompanying notes 317-23.
360 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 177 (1803); Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 304, 28 F. Cas. 1012 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,857).
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enactment. 361 By contrast, the only judicial authority clearly adopting the
positivist construction of "law" argued by Justice Iredell in Calder is the
opinion reluctantly announced by the court in State v. -, and fatally
undermined a decade later by Foy. On balance, then, the late eighteenth-
century legal authorities strongly support the position that the classical natural
law of "law" was widely held in the 1790s.
Against the American colonies' adoption and adaptation of Coke's higher-
law constitutionalism in the pre-Revolutionary era, the drafting and ratification
of the 1787 Constitution and the 1791 Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, together with decisions reported during the periods immediately
before and immediately after ratification, provide strong evidence that what we
now call substantive due process formed part of the original understanding of
the Due Process Clause: It imposed judicially enforceable unenumerated
substantive rights as limitations on congressional power.
C. Arguments Against an Original Meaning that Includes Substantive Due
Process
Of the contemporary commentators who reject substantive due process as
part of the original meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, only a few have seriously examined the question,362 and of these,
only one has engaged the argument that the original meaning of due process
included the classical understanding of "law" from the natural law tradition.
363
The counterarguments are based largely on history and linguistic context.
Professor Wolfe concluded that a broad substantive understanding of the Due
Process Clause was plausible in the late eighteenth century based upon the
classical understanding. However, he rejected this understanding in favor of a
narrower procedural one because (in his view) the historical evidence
supporting the substantive understanding came "well after the founding," and
the Due Process Clause was placed in the midst of procedural guarantees
361 See Trs. of Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 58 (1805); Lindsay v. Comm'rs, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38
(S.C. Const. Ct. App. 1796) (per Waities, J.); Zylstra v. Corp. of Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 382 (S.C. Ct.
Com. P1. 1794) (per Waities, J., joined by Bay, J.).
362 See BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 8; MEYER, supra note 8; Berger, "Law of the
Land," supra note 8; Harrison, supra note 252; Wolfe, supra note 8.
363 Although several commentators mention the classical view, see, e.g., 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 8;
Wolfe, supra note 8, only Professor Harrison gives it more than cursory examination before rejecting it, see
Harrison, supra note 252.
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within the text of the Bill of Rights. 364 Ms. Meyer contended that the original
understanding of the Due Process Clause in the late eighteenth century is
identical to the original understanding of Chapter 29 of Magna Carta in the
early thirteenth century-both merely guaranteed that a trial be held according
to generally applicable procedures prior to judgment and imposition of a
criminal penalty. 365  She further contended that those who held a broader
substantive understanding of the guarantee of due process were misled by
366Coke's mistaken reading of Chapter 29. Professor Jurow made a similar
argument about thirteenth-century meaning, but was more tentative about its
relevance to the contemporary understanding of due process.
367
Professor Berger gave the most detailed consideration of the relevant
judicial precedents, distinguishing or otherwise rejecting the authority of every
late eighteenth-century decision that might support a substantive reading of the
Clause. 368  Finally, Professor Harrison expressly rejected the classical
understanding of "law" as wholly implausible, focusing entirely on other
usages of "law" in the 1787 constitutional text which are inconsistent with the
classical understanding, particularly those in the Contracts, Ex Post Facto,
Presentment, and Supremacy Clauses.
364 Wolfe, supra note 8, at 227.
Professor Wolfe also appeals to the lack of a ratification controversy over the Due Process Clause,
which, he contends, would have been "inconceivable" if the Clause had been understood as a "broad guarantee
against arbitrary government" whose protections exceeded those of Chapter 29. Id. This argument has two
serious flaws. First, what matters for an originalist interpretation of the Due Process Clause is not the public
meaning of Chapter 29 in thirteenth-century England, but rather its public meaning in the United States in the
late eighteenth century. That a Due Process Clause with broad substantive reach would have far exceeded the
original understanding of Chapter 29 is thus entirely beside the point. Second, Wolfe ignores that the promise
of a Bill of Rights was a Federalist tactic to secure ratification of the original Constitution by placating Anti-
Federalist fears of national power. If the Due Process Clause was originally understood to include a general
guarantee against substantive deprivations of natural and fundamental customary rights by the national
government, then its addition to the Constitution would probably not have provoked controversy among either
group. Anti-Federalist fear of national encroachment on natural and customary rights was partially assuaged
by the Bill of Rights, while the Federalists thought the Bill of Rights unnecessary and redundant with respect
to the protection of such rights. See supra text accompanying notes 283-88.
365 MEYER, supra note 8, at 128, 149.
366 Id. at 137-38.
367 Jurow, supra note 8, at 266 (noting that it may not matter to Supreme Court doctrine if Coke's
equation law of the land and due process of law was historically incorrect).
368 See Berger, "Law of the Land," supra note 8, at 14-20 (discussing late eighteenth-century precedent
on law-of-the-land clauses).
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1. Counterarguments from History
a. Thirteenth-Century Meaning
Meyer and Jurow made persuasive cases that the original thirteenth-century
understanding of the "due process of law," if not the "law of the land," was
narrowly procedural, requiring merely that the king follow well-established
common law procedures before enforcing feudal or criminal penalties.
369
Berger additionally argued that the "law of the land" was originally understood
to apply only to the king and his agents-an indisputable proposition, because
no Parliament or other such legislative entity was even contemplated in the
early thirteenth century. They all blame Coke for this confusion.
370
Meyer used her conclusion that the original English understanding of the
law of the land was entirely procedural as the premise to an argument that
substantive due process is historically unjustified. 371  Berger used his
conclusion that the "law of the land" bound only the executive to dismiss the
authority of Bowman v. Middleton,372 Trustees of the University of North
Carolina v. Foy, and other decisions that relied on the classical understanding
of "law" to impose unenumerated limits on state legislative authority.
373
Both Meyer and Berger relied on the mistaken premise that the original
understanding must also be an accurate historical understanding. But
originalism does not require that interpretations of the Constitution be
historically correct in some larger sense; it only requires that such
interpretations coincide with the general public meaning of the constitutional
words being interpreted at the time the Constitution was drafted and ratified.
Even if Berger's and Meyer's historical analyses are correct-that is, even if
the law-of-the-land clause of Chapter 29 was indeed originally understood to
protect only certain common law rights to judicial process, and then only
against royal encroachment-this determination says almost nothing about
369 See MEYER, supra note 8, at 135 (discussing procedural requirements followed by the king in criminal
proceedings); Jurow, supra note 8, at 265-79; accord Whitten, supra note 8, at 742, 743 (concluding that "due
process of law" merely referred to the standard common law procedure by which persons were summoned to
answer and defend prosecutions and lawsuits that threatened life, liberty, or property).
370 See, e.g., BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 226; MEYER, supra note 8, at 137-38,
140; Berger, "Law of the Land," supra note 8, at 5; Jurow, supra note 8, at 271-72, 277-79 (all discussing and
rejecting Coke's interpretation).
371 MEYER, supra note 8, at 127.
372 I S.C.L. (I Bay) 252 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. 1792).
373 Berger, "Law of the Land, " supra note 8, at 18-20, 24, 30.
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how the American public understood "law," the "law of the land," and the "due
process of law" nearly 600 years later.
374
It is clear that Coke equated the law of the land with the due process of law,
and that he understood both to have imposed substantive limitations on actions
of the king. Revolutionary Americans adopted these propositions wholesale,
and carried them into independence and beyond. It is less clear whether Coke
really thought that the law of the land bound Parliament, as Bonham's Case
seems to have suggested,37 5 but revolutionary Americans believed that it did,
and that is all that matters. 376 Whether the law of the land was originally
understood to have a procedural dimension that bound the legislature, whether
Coke correctly stated the original thirteenth-century meaning of the law of the
land and the due process of law, whether late eighteenth-century Americans
correctly understood and applied Coke, whether the wholesale adoption of
Coke by Americans ultimately led them down a path of historically
unwarranted understandings of both phrases-these questions are all irrelevant
to how Americans in fact understood the phrase "due process of law" in the
late eighteenth century.
b. Belated Judicial Authority
Although Wolfe ultimately rejected any substantive understanding of the
Due Process Clause as part of its original meaning, 37 7 he did acknowledge a
line of cases that "gave a broader reading to 'due process of law"' by defining
"law" in accordance with the classical view. 378 Wolfe mentioned "widespread
agreement" that a legislative act had to be generally applicable to be properly
within the definition of "law" in early American jurisprudence, and suggested
"taking property from A and giving to B" as the paradigmatic example of an
act lacking generality and thus the character of "law." 379 He then traced the
various incarnations of the classical view in the early nineteenth century,
conceding that "there is some historical evidence which could be used to
support a broader reading of the due process clause. ' 38° However, he rejected
374 Cf. Whitten, supra note 8, at 741-42 (arguing that whether Coke correctly equated the "law of the
land" with the "due process of law" is irrelevant to the original meaning of these clauses among late
eighteenth-century Americans who took Coke's equation for granted).
375 See text accompanying supra note 90.
376 See text accompanying supra notes 189-93.
377 Wolfe, supra note 8, at 222.
378 Id. at 224.
379 id.
380 Id. at 227.
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a broader substantive reading of the Due Process Clause based upon the
classical view because, in his view, judicial precedent supporting these broader
readings came "well after the founding." 381  Harrison made a similar
argument.382
Wolfe and Harrison are simply wrong. While the cases that Wolfe
discussed are indeed all from the nineteenth century, 38 3 he ignored the wealth
of earlier precedent from the years preceding and immediately following the
1791 ratification of the Fifth Amendment. Robin v. Hardaway (1772), Butler
v. Craig (1787), Ham v. McClaws (1789), Bowman v. Middleton (1792),
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance (1792), Zylstra v. Corp. of Charleston (1794),
Lindsay v. Commissioners (1796), Calder v. Bull (1798), and Marbury v.
Madison (1803) all support the conclusion that judges and attorneys during that
period understood the meaning of "law" to include a fundamental normative
dimension as prescribed by classical natural law theory and higher-law
constitutionalism. 384 Perhaps Wolfe had these cases in mind when he referred
to a broader substantive reading of due process among the "early American
courts," though he did not provide a citation. 38 5 Harrison made the identical
error, dismissing the historical support for substantive due process almost
entirely on the basis of authorities from the early nineteenth century or later.38 6
Of course, neither Wolfe's nor Harrison's arguments on this point can be
credited without their taking the eighteenth-century decisions into account.
387
381 id.
382 Harrison, supra note 252, at 530.
383 See Wolfe, supra note 8, at 222-27 (discussing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Davidson
v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819);
Wynehamer v. New York, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); Taylor v. Porter & Ford, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); Trs.
of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 58 (1805)).
384 See supra text accompanying notes 178-82, 228-41, 318-35.
385 Wolfe, supra note 8, at 224.
386 See Harrison, supra note 252, at 530 (mentioning only one eighteenth-century decision, Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.), but not discussing it).
387 See Wolfe, supra note 8, at 226-27.
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2. Counterarguments from Context
a. Usage in the 1787 Constitutional Text
Harrison gave the classical understanding of "law" the most extended
treatment,388 though most of his discussion of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause was conceptual rather than historical, and none of it was
originalist. He focused virtually all of his discussion on the question whether
there exists a contextual basis for believing that the Due Process Clause
imposed substantive constraints on the definition or content of "law."
389
Harrison first observed that the classical understanding of "law" is directly
contradicted by Article I, which defines as "law" any act of Congress passed
by both Houses of Congress and then signed by the President, allowed to
become law without his or her signature, or reenacted by a two-thirds margin
after a presidential veto. 390  He also noted that the term "law" is used in
basically its positivist sense in the Ex Post Facto and Supremacy Clauses.39'
"Nowhere in the 1787 document does the word 'law' appear in any context
that suggests that it refers to some subset of legally binding commands that is
defined by formal or substantive criteria." 392 Harrison conceded that the term
"law" might have two senses, one positivist and one normative, but rejected
this as confusing and irrational usage that would not have been adopted by
11 393
"sensible" drafters. He made particular reference to the Supremacy Clause's
use of the term "law of the land" in this regard:
388 See Harrison, supra note 252, at 525 ("Maybe the word 'law' is the key. If all deprivations of life,
liberty, and property must be with due process of law and if some purported source of authority for a
deprivation is not law, then it is possible to say that the deprivation was without due process of law.").
389 Id. at 527, 529-30.
Harrison acknowledged the possibility that legislation might not be "law" if it lacks certain formal
characteristics, such as "generality, prospectivity, publicity, [or] intelligibility," but ultimately concluded that it
is difficult to squeeze "[m]ost of modem substantive due process" out of a formal concept of law. Id. at 525,
527.
'90 Id. at 530-31.
391 Id. at 531; accord Hyman, supra note 8, at 12-16; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of
Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." (emphasis added)); id. art. VI, cl. 2 ('This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." (emphasis added)).
392 Harrison, supra note 252, at 531; accord Hyman, supra note 8, at 16.
393 Harrison, supra note 252, at 531-32.
Harrison actually discussed the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause at these pages, but his
conceptual and contextual arguments apply equally to the addition of the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause to the Constitution in 1791. See id.
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Acts of Congress and treaties, the non-constitutional sources of
federal law, are not just the law of the land, but "the supreme Law of
the Land." Deprivations pursuant to them are pursuant to the law of
the land. To deny this would be to assert that an entire phrase has
different meanings when used in the Supremacy Clause and the Fifth
Amendment. No rational person drafting this hypothetical Fifth
Amendment, seeking to impose limitations on the legislature, would
use words that already appear in the original document and hope to
give them a new meaning.
In sum, concludes Harrison, "law" should be understood in the Due Process
Clause in the essentially positivist manner in which it is deployed elsewhere in
the Constitution-namely, to signify that which "is legally binding," and not to
refer to any normative criteria.
395
Initially, one must note that Harrison's argument is not originalist, but
textualist. He draws conclusions about the meaning of the Due Process Clause
from how a disembodied and apparently contemporary reasonable person
would understand the word "law" in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights,
not how the public in 1791 understood it. There are multiple explanations why
the original understanding of "law" in the 1787 Constitution does not exhaust
the original understanding of "law" in the 1791 Due Process Clause. First, the
drafters of the Fifth Amendment were not intently focused on the how the
language of the Due Process Clause would fit with the language of the 1787
Constitution, because they were hardly focused on the Bill of Rights at all.
While the participants in the Philadelphia Convention were careful indeed in
drafting the 1787 Constitution, 396 the members of the First Congress paid little
attention to the whole matter of the Bill of Rights. Few members of Congress
besides Madison cared about a bill of rights,397 and even he approached the
project as a "nauseous" undertaking triggered mostly by the need to neutralize
194 Id. at 546-47 (citations omitted); accord Hyman, supra note 8, at 18-19.
395 Harrison, supra note 252, at 547 n. 151; accord MEYER, supra note 8, at 146 (arguing that the "law of
the land" in the Supremacy Clause "refers to the laws of the entire land, consisting of federal and state laws,
and, among them, the United States Constitution, the acts of Congress made in pursuance thereof and the
treaties are 'supreme' so as to supersede inconsistent laws of the states"); Hyman, supra note 8, at 20 ("[T]he
convention in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 ...decided what shall be a law and what shall be the
supreme law of the land. The Due Process Clause is consistent with that functional definition of 'law' in the
original unamended Constitution.").
396 FRIEDMAN, supra note 203, at 102 (describing the 1787 constitutional text as "marvelously supple, put
together with great political skill").
397 See LEVY, supra note 8, at 34; see also id. at 37-38 (noting that the House abandoned Madison's
original plan to place each amendment within the body of the existing Constitution because it did not wish to
waste time debating such a "trifling" matter).
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political support for a second constitutional convention. 398  Following the
introduction of the proposed amendments in early June 1789,399 the House did
nothing with them until late July, when it referred them to committee only after
Madison literally begged for their consideration. 4° The House did not take up
the amendments for debate until mid-August, and neither the House nor the
Senate spent more than a few days in debate and negotiation of the text before
approving the final version that Congress reported to the states in late
September.401 Judge Bork observed that the Bill of Rights "appears to have
been a hastily drafted document upon which little thought was expended,,
40 2
and Professor Smith has aptly called the final product the "casual" Bill of
Rights.403  It is thus unremarkable that "law" as used in the Supremacy and
Due Process Clauses might have multiple conflicting meanings.
Second, the inattention to multiple uses of "law" is likely a consequence of
the "due process of law" and the "law of the land" having been understood
during the revolutionary and early-independence periods as terms of art-that
is, general, "catchall" phrases prohibiting arbitrary or otherwise unjust
legislation and designed to protect the residuum of liberty exemplified by
natural and customary fundamental rights.4°  There is nothing remarkable
about one's using "law" in its classical natural law sense as part of a term of art
like "due process of law," while also using "law" in its positivist sense as a
stand-alone noun. Finally, Madison and the First Congress may well have
chosen the "due process of law" formulation for the Fifth Amendment over its
"law of the land" equivalent precisely to avoid the confusion of positivism and
natural rights that is at the center of Harrison's argument. Professor Miller
398 Id. at 12, 34.
'9 Id. at 35.
40 Id. at 37.
401 See 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 226, at 1012-67 (providing a
legislative history of the Bill of Rights).
402 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971).
403 Steven D. Smith, The Writing on the Constitution and the Writing on the Wall, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 391, 395 (1995); see also id. at 397 (describing how the Bill of Rights was adopted "hastily, casually,
virtually (it seems) without interest or reflection").
404 See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 304 (2007) ("The
term 'due process of law' in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is a term of art; it has a specialized legal
meaning over and above the concatenation of the words in the phrase."); Hill, supra note 29, at 1271-72
(discussing the interpretation of "due process of law" during the Revolutionary period); supra text
accompanying note 201.
"Law" is not the only constitutional term to which the framers gave multiple meanings. "Person" is
obviously used differently in the Due Process Clause than it is in the Fugitive Slave Clause and the other
slavery clauses that euphemistically refer to slaves as "other persons."
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explained that the phrase "law of the land" in the Supremacy Clause places
enacted federal law-the Constitution, treaties, and federal statutes-above
state constitutions and laws in the hierarchy of American law.40 5 The context
for the term "law" in the Supremacy Clause, in other words, strongly suggests
positive-law enactments.40 6 "Yet, Magna Carta's 'law of the land' was not
restricted to-in fact probably did not even refer to-positive law, but rather
meant common law. 40 7 This understanding created its own set of drafting
problems because, for the framers, the possibility of federal common law
jurisdiction, particularly for crimes, was a controversial and intensely divisive
issue in the years immediately after ratification of the 1787 constitutional
text.408  At the same time, federal criminal trials had to be conducted in
409
accordance with some law. Accordingly, in Miller's words, "'due process
of law' was the most appropriate language to use in the circumstances" to
require the conduct of federal trials in accordance with the procedural
requirements of due process, without projecting the common law onto the
meaning of the "law of the land" in the Supremacy Clause.410
One can take Miller's explanation as a premise without accepting his
conclusion: One can grant that Madison changed the language from "law of the
land" to "due process of law" in the Fifth Amendment to avoid interpretive
confusion with the Supremacy Clause, without agreeing that Madison chose
the "due process" formulation because he wanted to strictly confine the Due
Process Clause to procedural rights. One could equally argue that Madison
chose the "due process" formulation precisely to protect, along with procedural
rights, unenumerated natural and customary rights that had long been
associated with law-of-the-land clauses in state constitutions. It is widely
accepted that Americans in the late eighteenth century shared Coke's equation
of the "due process of law" and the "law of the land."4 11 There is no evidence
405 Charles A. Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law: The American Constitutional Tradition, in 18




408 Id.; see, e.g., Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1106-07 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360); St. George
Tucker, Of the Unwritten, or Common Law of England; and Its Introduction into, and Authority Within the
United American States, in I BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND THE COMMONWEALTH
OF VIRGINIA, app. note E, at 378, 407, 411-12 (Philadelphia, Birch & Small 1803) (strenuously opposing
federal jurisdiction for common law crimes).
409 Miller, Due Process, supra note 405, at 11.
410 id.
411 See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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that Madison harbored any "plan to fashion new rights or depart from settled
norms" in drafting the Due Process Clause or the Bill of Rights generally;
indeed, the evidence is that he intended to "formulate a document which
reflected a consensus about widely held values."' 2  Madison himself
maintained that ".[e]very thing of a controvertible nature that might endanger
the concurrence of two-thirds of each House and three-fourths of the States
was studiously avoided.'
4 13
On this basis, then, Madison would not have used "due process of law" in
the Fifth Amendment if doing so would have been understood as a significant
departure from the reach of the state law-of-the-land clauses; rather, he would
have used that formulation to avoid the positivist connotation associated with
that phrase in the Supremacy Clause. Because the state clauses were generally
understood to protect unwritten natural and customary substantive rights, as
well as procedural rights, the Due Process Clause can be assumed to have had
the same reach at the time it was drafted and ratified.
b. Placement Among the Procedural Guarantees of the Bill of Rights
Wolfe attached significance to the placement of the Due Process Clause in
the middle of what he contended are unambiguously procedural guarantees in
the text of the Bill of Rights. 414  He observed that the Fifth Amendment is
preceded and followed by amendments guaranteeing protections for the
accused in criminal proceedings, such as freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures, and rights to issuance of a search or arrest warrant only upon
probable cause, to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, to
confrontation of witnesses, to compulsory process, and to assistance of
412 Ely, Oxymoron Reconsidered, supra note 29, at 325; accord id. ("Since the view that 'due process of
law' and 'law of the land' had the same meaning was broadly shared, it seems unlikely that Madison
envisioned any departure from the general understanding of this concept."); Riggs, supra note 29, at 992-93
(arguing that there is no reason to believe that the Fifth Amendment's use of due process, rather than the "law-
of-the-land phraseology appearing in every state constitution having such a provision, was intended to change
the meaning") ; see also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276
(1856) (per Curtis, J.) (speculating that "due process of law" was used to preserve the widely held
understanding of "the law of the land" without having to also use the typically conjoined "by the judgment of
his peers," which would have been redundant of the jury-trial guarantees set forth in Article III and what
would become the Sixth and Seventh Amendments).
413 Ely, Oxymoron Reconsidered, supra note 29, at 325 (quoting Letter from Madison to Jefferson (May
27, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 272 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1979)); accord
Graber, supra note 269, at 381 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (June 21, 1789), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 254
(Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991)).
414 Wolfe, supra note 8, at 217; accord Reeder, supra note 8, at 212.
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
counsel.415  Within the Fifth Amendment itself, the Due Process Clause is
immediately preceded by declarations of rights to indictment by grand jury and
freedom from double-jeopardy prosecutions and self-incrimination, and is
immediately followed by a declaration of the right to just compensation when
one's property is taken by the national government for public use. 416 Wolfe
took this context as powerful evidence that the framers did not understand the
Due Process Clause to have a broad substantive meaning, 417 concluding rather
that the Clause was understood merely to require that a person faced with a
deprivation receive the process specified by prevailing law, positive or
418
otherwise. Berger similarly argued that the Due Process Clause must have
protected only procedural rights because its state law-of-the-land analogues
were generally placed with criminal procedure protections. 419 Both arguments
are weak.
First, it is unlikely that textual placement had interpretive significance in
late eighteenth-century rights declarations. For example, the declarations of
both Pennsylvania and North Carolina placed their law-of-the-land clauses in
the midst of criminal procedure guarantees, yet this placement did not bar
judicial constructions of those clauses that incorporated substantive-rights
guarantees based upon the classical understanding of "law.",421  Indeed, the
415 Wolfe, supra note 8, at 217-18.
416 Id.
417 Id. at 218.
418 Id. at 218-19.
For support of this argument, Wolfe also drew on Blackstone's placement of common law "process" in
the midst of a discussion on criminal law, which appears to identify "process" as the common law procedures
by which a defendant is brought before the court. Id. at 220-21. Wolfe himself observed, however, that
Blackstone's Commentaries had only just been published at the time of the Revolution, and that Coke
remained the more influential commentator in the United States even when the Bill of Rights was drafted and
ratified a generation later. Id. at 221; see also Riggs, supra note 29, at 973 (arguing that Blackstone never
equated "process" with "due process," and that "other commentators, notably Coke, whose works were also
current in colonial and revolutionary America, appeared to equate 'due process' with 'law of the land"').
419 BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 223.
420 Pennsylvania's law-of-the-land clause comes at the end of a section listing criminal procedure rights,
and the section itself immediately follows a section dealing with unlawful searches and seizures, and
immediately precedes a section listing rights against indictment by information and double-jeopardy trials. See
PA, CONST. art. IX, §§ 8-10 (1790), reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 214, at 1554-55. North Carolina's law-
of-the-land clause is set by itself in its own section, but is immediately preceded by numerous recitations of
criminal procedure rights, and immediately followed by two sections listing rights to trial by jury and speedy
review of lawfulness when one's liberty has been restrained. N.C. CONST., Declaration of Rights, arts. VII-
XIV, reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 214, at 1409-10.
421 Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dail.) 304, 28 F. Cas. 1012 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,857);
Trs. of Univ, of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 58 (1805); see also Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,
2804 (2008) (rejecting interpretive significance of textual proximity to other constitutional provisions).
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very distinction between "procedural" and "substantive" rights had no
eighteenth-century resonance, 422 and there is no evidence that Madison
attempted to separate the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights into
"substantive" and "procedural" groupings.
Second, one cannot draw firm conclusions from the order and placement of
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights because Madison's original plan was to
interlineate the proposed amendments into the text of the 1787 Constitution; it
was only later that Congress decided to group them together as a set of stand-
alone texts. Thus, the order in which rights appear in the Bill of Rights was
not dictated by the content of the rights themselves, but rather by the order in
which they were originally proposed to be inserted into the 1787 constitutional
text. For example, the first two amendments on Madison's initial list were an
addition to the preamble that would have expressly stated that the purpose of
423government is to protect the natural rights of the people, and a provision that
would have defined the maximum number of people that a member of the
House could represent,424 neither of which was ever ratified. With particular
respect to the Fifth Amendment, Wolfe's argument about the "procedural
context" of the Due Process Clause is blunted by the fact that most of the rights
in the current Bill of Rights were proposed to be inserted between two
enumerations of substantive rights in Article I, Section 9 of the 1787
constitutional text: the prohibition on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws
in Clause 3, and the prohibition on direct taxes in Clause 4.425
Finally, even if one assumes that the particular placement of the Due
Process Clause in the larger text of the Fifth Amendment and the Bill of Rights
has interpretive significance, this placement would support the substantive
reading as much as the procedural one. Noting the Takings Clause's direct
prohibition on the government's taking of property except for "public use" and
upon payment of a "just compensation," Wolfe conceded that this Clause
might be read to deal not with procedure but with the substance of
law as it affects property rights, since it would preclude a legislative
act authorizing the taking of private property for public purposes
422 See McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process, supra note 190, at 399, 404 (observing that due
process originated in American constitutional law as a "unitary concept," and that the distinction between
"substantive" and "procedural" due process did not emerge until after the New Deal, "to describe what the
[Supreme] Court believed that it was no longer doing"); see also id. at 406 (noting that the phrase "substantive
due process" did not appear in a Supreme Court majority opinion until 1954, or in any opinion until 1948).
423 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 226, at 1026.
424 Id.
425 Id. at 1026-27.
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without just compensation (and also, presumably a law authorizing
the taking of private property for private purposes).
426
He acknowledged that the substantive focus of the Takings Clause suggests "a
less rigorously procedural context for the foregoing due process clause. ' '427 He
nonetheless insisted that the context for the Due Process Clause is procedural
by noting that a semicolon separates. it from the immediately following (and
substantive) Takings Clause, while only a comma separates it from the
immediately preceding (and procedural) Self-Incrimination Clause, thereby
implying that the text associates the Due Process Clause more closely with the
428former procedural right than the latter substantive one.
The weight of Wolfe's argument for a strictly procedural Due Process
429Clause is a bit much for a single comma to carry, especially given the loose
syntax of the founding era even among highly educated persons. 43 ° Certainly,
it is insufficient in the face of the multiple judicial opinions and arguments of
counsel that imply or expressly invoke the classical understanding of "law"
and the substantive reading of due process.43' Believing that the textual
placement of the Due Process Clause has interpretive significance presupposes
the kind of conceptual organization and meticulous drafting that simply did not
occur in the introduction and ratification of the Bill of Rights. In the end, the
textual-placement argument simply cannot do the interpretive work that is
asked of it.
c. Redundancy
Harrison argued that the original meaning of the Due Process Clause is
redundant if it is understood to include unenumerated natural and customary
rights as limits on congressional acts. If such rights were thought to have had
426 Wolfe, supra note 8, at 225; accord Reeder, supra note 8, at 212.
427 Wolfe, supra note 8, at 225. Wolfe speculated that the Takings Clause might even have been placed
directly after the Due Process Clause to prevent reading the substantive limitations of the Due Process Clause
as "a barrier to the power of eminent domain." Id.
428 id.
429 Cf. Riggs, supra note 29, at 998 ("At this point structure flounders as a guide to interpretation. Has the
due process clause a greater affinity with the procedural rules that precede it, or with the substantive
limitations on takings that follow? Logically it could partake of both, which is the way the clause is currently
interpreted.").
430 See generally Edward Finegan, English in North America, in A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
§ 8.2.1, at 392-93 (Richard Hogg & David Denison eds., 2006) (summarizing Webster's project of
regularizing American syntax and spelling in the early nineteenth century).
431 See supra Parts lI.C.3, III.B.2.
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432
constitutional status even though unenumerated, Harrison argued, then
neither the federal Due Process Clause nor the state law-of-the-land clauses
added any constitutional rights not already protected as natural or customary
law:
If there is an unwritten constitution, then it is part of the law of the
land, just like the written constitution. If there is no unwritten
constitution, then the written constitution contains all of the law of
the land that is of constitutional status. In any event, the outcome
under a law of the land clause is entirely determined by the answer to
the prior question whether there is an unwritten constitution. The
clause adds nothing.
433
Once again, Harrison makes a textualist rather than an originalist argument.
Moreover, redundancy is a weak (and ironic) interpretive argument in any
legal context. As Professor Curtis has aptly observed, "Lawyers say
everything at least twice. 434  More importantly, the historical context that
generated the Due Process Clause compels rejection of any interpretive
argument based on redundancy. First, the Federalists had expressly argued that
the entire Bill of Rights was redundant. The Anti-Federalists disagreed,
believing that the Bill of Rights would make otherwise unenumerated natural
and customary rights more secure-a position to which even Madison was
eventually persuaded. Both positions presuppose the existence and force of
natural and customary rights independent of any textual enumeration. That the
Federalists were ultimately willing to promise a bill of rights that they believed
was unnecessary in order to obtain ratification of the Constitution does not
show that anyone understood the Due Process Clause to protect only rights to
criminal procedure.
Second, Harrison's redundancy argument proves too much. It leads to
exceedingly strange conclusions about the procedural rights that the Due
Process Clause is purportedly limited to protecting. For example, Article III
guarantees trial by jury in criminal cases, and the Seventh Amendment
guarantees it in civil cases. Harrison's redundancy argument would thus
require the conclusion that the Due Process Clause cannot be read to protect
the right to a jury trial-the very exemplar of procedural due process in Anglo-
American jurisprudence-because protection of that right by the Due Process
432 Harrison, supra note 252, at 548-49.
431 Id. at 549-50 (citation omitted).
434 MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 183 (1986).
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Clause would be redundant of the right's protection elsewhere in the
Constitution.435 Acceptance of Harrison's redundancy argument, therefore,
would exclude from the original understanding of the Due Process Clause a
right that was originally understood to be at the conceptual core of due process.
CONCLUSION
In his battles with the Stuart kings, Coke maintained that Magna Carta's
"law of the land" was synonymous with the "due process of law," and that both
phrases symbolized the preeminence of substantive common law rights over
the royal prerogative. Coke's higher-law constitutionalism was deployed by
the American colonists in their revolutionary struggle against Britain and
incorporated into their constitutional thinking, as evidenced by their
revolutionary rhetoric, their conceptualization of their new state constitutions
as primarily frames of government that recognized but did not create
fundamental rights, and their conflict over the lack of a bill of rights in the
federal Constitution.
Higher-law constitutionalism forms the necessary background to any
consideration of the original meaning of the "due process of law" in the Fifth
Amendment. The newly independent American states adhered to the classical
definition of "law" from the natural law tradition, which held that an unjust
legislative act is not truly a "law." In their constitutional understanding,
adherence to the classical definition meant that legislative acts that violated
natural or customary rights-or, what amounted to the same thing, that
exceeded higher-law limits on legislative power-were void and unenforceable
under state law-of-the-land clauses and the federal Due Process Clause,
because they effected deprivations of life, liberty, or property without
conforming to the "law" of the land or the due process of "law."
The classical definition of law and the substantive reading of the due
process of law that it underwrites are evident in legal dictionaries of the era
and implicit (and occasionally explicit) in judicial opinions discussing the
nullity and voidness of "unconstitutional" legislation. They are also evident in
majority and seriatim judicial opinions in the years immediately before and
immediately after the ratification of the Due Process Clause as part of the Bill
435 Justice Curtis, however, apparently held precisely this view of the reach of the Due Process Clause.
See supra note 412.
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of Rights in 1791. Finally, there is little authority that contradicts either the
classical definition or a substantive reading of the federal Due Process Clause.
On balance, the historical evidence shows that one widespread
understanding of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in 1791
included judicial recognition and enforcement of unenumerated natural and
customary rights against congressional action. This understanding not only
textually grounds important unenumerated rights against the federal
government, it effectively rebuts the conventional wisdom that substantive due
process was the belated invention of an activist federal judiciary intent on
writing its personal value preferences into constitutional law. Perhaps most
important, an original understanding of the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause that includes substantive due process places on opponents of the
doctrine the burden of explaining how that understanding was lost when the
Fourteenth Amendment was drafted and ratified less than eighty years later.
A shift in the burden of proof, of course, is not itself proof. There remain
crucial additional questions that must be answered before one might venture
the conclusion that substantive due process is plausibly within the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as that of the Fifth. These
questions include whether the list of unenumerated natural and customary
rights protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause was thought to
be expandable by progressive common law development, or whether it instead
was confined to those particular unenumerated rights recognized or
contemplated in 1791;436 whether the ubiquitous and unwritten "general
constitutional law" of the antebellum state courts interacted with Swift v.
Tyson 437 and other antebellum understandings of federal jurisdiction to create
conditions for an expansion of substantive due process through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause;438 and how these and other questions might
436 See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004) (holding that the jurisdictional
grant of the federal Alien Tort Claims Act of 1790 included causes of action that were not recognized when the
Act was passed, but that were added by post-enactment elaboration and development of the law of nations);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 64 (1985) (posing the
"vexing question ... whether the framers, in adopting common law precepts in the Bill of Rights, intended to
federalize an evolving body of common law or simply tofreeze an existing body of common law").
4"7 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
438 See generally Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877) (observing that it is inappropriate
for federal courts to rely on the general constitutional law except in diversity); Michael G. Collins, Before
Lochner-Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263,
1263 (2000) (documenting the relationship between Swift's authorization of federal court development of a
body of federal common law from the "general constitutional law" in diversity cases and the rise of substantive
due process in the late nineteenth century); Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts, 92
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affect our understanding of the debates surrounding the report and ratification
of that Clause.439
These, however, are questions for another day. It is enough to have shown
that substantive due process was one widespread and plausible understanding
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment when it was ratified in
1791.
MINN. L. REV. 1, 59-67 (2007) (documenting how the Bill or Rights influenced the development of a body of
"general constitutional law" in the state courts).
439 See generally CURTNS, supra note 434 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to apply
the Bill of Rights to the states).
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APPENDIX
CERTAIN ATIRIBUTES OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY STATES (1776-1801)'4
State Rights Protected Declaration or Bill Chapter 29
(years in force) (other than Chapter 29 of Rights Separate Analogue




r Connecticu1tfConnecticut Equal justice, bail-under No; affirmation of Yes(1776-1818) affirmation colonial charter (Constitution 2)("Constitution")
Delaware
(1776-1792) Common law, anti-slavery,
("Constitution, or anti- establishment No No
system of
government")
(1792-1831) Extensive enumeration Yes
Delawrte [, Ye 7)("Constitution")
Georgia Free exercise, excessive
(1777-1789) fines & bail, habeas corpus, No No("Constitution") press, jury trial
Georgia Press, jury trial, habeas
(1789-1798) corpus, free exercise, no No No
("Constitution") entailment of estates
Georgia Press, jury trial, no ex post
(1798-1861) facto laws, no imprisonment No
(1798-1861tion) for debt, habeas corpus, free
("Constitution") Jexercise, anti-establishment
Maryland Yes
(1776-1851) ("A Declaration of
("A Declaration of Rights"; Yes
Rights, and the Extensive enumeration "Constitution, or (Declaration of
Constitution and Form of Rights art. XXI)
Form of Government, &c")
Government") G m &c.")
440 Information is from both volumes of POORE, supra note 214.
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State Rights Protected Declaration or Bill Chapter 29
(years in force) (other than Chapter 29 of Rights Separate Analogue





Massachusetts ("A Declaration of Yes
(1780-Present) Extensive enumeration Rights"; "The Frame (Declaration of
("Constitution") of Rights art. XII)
Government")
New Hampshire Protestant free exercise- i No; affirmation of
(1776-1784) under colonial charter colonial charter No
("Constitution")
New Hampshire (Y es ] Yes
(1784-1792) Extensive enumeration R "The o (Bill of Rights("Constitution") Rights"; "The Form at V
of Government") art. XV)
New Hampshire Yes Yes(1792-Present) Extensive enumeration ("Bill of Rights" (Bill of Rights172-seont) Extensiveenum"Form of _ _ _("Constitution") Government") art. 15)
New Jersey Free exercise, anti-
(1776-1844) establishment, common law, No No
("Constitution") jury trial
New York r1 Y s(1777 1821) Free exercise, jury trial, Nes("Constitution") common law, attainder No (art. XIII)
Yes
North Carolina ("A Declaration of Yes
(1776-1861) Extensive enumeration Rights, &c."; "The (Declaration of
("Constitution") Constitution, or Rights art. XII)Form of
Government")
Yes
Pennsylvania ("A Declaration of Yes
(1776-1790) Extensive enumeration Rights"; "Plan or (Declaration of
("Constitution") Frame of Rights art. IX)
Government")
Pennsylvania Yes Yes
(1790-1838) Extensive enumeration (last article of (Declaration of
("Constitution") Constitution) Rights art. LX,§ 9)
Rhode Island Free exercise-under o action; continuedIunder colonial No(until 1842) colonial charter chercharter
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State Rights Protected Declaration or Bill Chapter 29
(years in force) (other than Chapter 29 of Rights Separate Analogue





(1778-1790) Free exercise, press No (art. XLI)
("Constitution")
Free exercise, no bills of
South Carolina attainder or ex post facto(1790-1861) laws, no impairments of No Yes("Constitution") contracts, no excessive bail, (art. IX, § 2)
no cruel or unusual
punishments, jury trial, press
Yes
Vermont ("Declaration of Yes
(1777-1786) 44 ' Extensive enumeration Rights"; "Plan or (ch. 1, art. X)Frame of
Government")
Yes
Vermont ("Declaration of Yes
(1786-1793) Extensive enumeration Rights"; "Plan or (ch. I, art. XI)Frame of
Government")
Virginia Yes Yes
(1776-1830) Extensive enumeration ("Bill of Rights"; (Bill of Rights
("Bill of Rights"; "Constitution") § 8)
"Constitution")
441 Vermont was not formally admitted as a state until 1791, after Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
New York formally renounced their respective claims to its territory. It had, however, organized its own
government and functioned as a separate, independent colony since the early 1770s, and consequently adopted
its own constitution in 1777 in the wake of the others' declarations of independence in 1776. See supra note
215.
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